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Abstract
Over the last several decades, reliable communication has received con-
siderable attention in the area of dynamic network configurations and
distributed processing techniques. Traditional secure communications
mainly considered transmission cryptography, which has been developed
in the network layer. However, the nature of wireless transmission in-
troduces various challenges of key distribution and management in es-
tablishing secure communication links. Physical layer security has been
recently recognized as a promising new design paradigm to provide se-
curity in wireless networks in addition to existing conventional crypto-
graphic methods, where the physical layer dynamics of fading channels
are exploited to establish secure wireless links. On the other hand, with
the ever-increasing demand of wireless access users, multi-antenna trans-
mission has been considered as one of effective approaches to improve
the capacity of wireless networks. Multi-antenna transmission applied
in physical layer security has extracted more and more attentions by
exploiting additional degrees of freedom and diversity gains.
In this thesis, different multi-antenna transmit optimization techniques
are developed for physical layer secure transmission. The secrecy rate
optimization problems (i.e., power minimization and secrecy rate max-
imization) are formulated to guarantee the optimal power allocation.
First, transmit optimization for multiple-input single-output (MISO) se-
crecy channels are developed to design secure transmit beamformer that
minimize the transmit power to achieve a target secrecy rate. Besides,
the associated robust scheme with the secrecy rate outage probability
constraint are presented with statistical channel uncertainty, where the
outage probability constraint requires that the achieved secrecy rate
exceeds certain thresholds with a specific probability. Second, multi-
antenna cooperative jammer (CJ) is presented to provide jamming ser-
vices that introduces extra interference to assist a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) secure transmission. Transmit optimization for this CJ-
aided MIMO secrecy channel is designed to achieve an optimal power
allocation. Moreover, secure transmission is achieved when the CJ in-
troduces charges for its jamming service based on the amount of the
interference caused to the eavesdropper, where the Stackelberg game
is proposed to handle, and the Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically
derived. Finally, transmit optimization for MISO secure simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) is investigated, where
secure transmit beamformer is designed with/without the help of artifi-
cial noise (AN) to maximize the achieved secrecy rate such that satisfy
the transmit power budget and the energy harvesting (EH) constraint.
The performance of all proposed schemes are validated by MATLAB
simulation results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless communication techniques have experienced an explosive growth in the
communication industry, capturing more and more attention in terms of research
[1,2]. As such, there are various state-of-the-art applications such as wireless sensor
network (WSN), WIFI, global positioning system (GPS), remote surveillance sys-
tem, smart grids, etc., which are emerging from theoretical research ideas through
to commercialisation. The exponential progress of these applications has driven the
development of wireless electronic devices, such as mobile phones, laptop comput-
ers, etc., which promise a bright future for wireless networks. An increasing number
of wireless customers has resulted into huge demands for the limited spectrum re-
sources available, such that wireless services are becoming overloaded. In order to
meet with these ever-increasing demands, some novel techniques and approaches
need to be developed for future wireless communication networks.
There are three criteria that are associated with such demands: quality of service
(QoS), energy efficiency (EE) and security, which have been widely considered as
the main driving forces for the evolutions of wireless communication networks. Tra-
ditionally, these requirements can be satisfied by increasing the transmission band-
width and the transmit power. However, frequency reuse becomes a novel approach
to serve an increasing number of users within the availability of extreme scarce radio
spectrum. Hence, it will not be always a good solution to increase transmit power
as it will increase the co-channel interference power. In addition, power saving in
cellular networks not only alleviates financial burden to service providers, but also
reduces the emission of the greenhouse gases effectively. Therefore, a better system
design that fully exploits the limited spectral resource is essential.
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Figure 1.1: Layer protocol
1.1 Wireless Security Motivations
Security, as one of the most important criteria in wireless networks, plays a very sig-
nificant role in wireless communications, ensuring that some important messages are
confidential enough to prevent eavesdropping from unauthorized users. There are
three main reasons leading to the security issues: First of all, wireless channels are
vulnerable to channel jamming, so that an eavesdropper can easily jam and prevent
legitimate users from accessing the network. This threat is more difficult to counter
as it aims at disrupting traffic and not intercepting information. Secondly, an active
attacker can obtain illegal access to the important network resources and bypass se-
cure infrastructures (i.e., firewalls) without the authentication mechanisms. Finally,
eavesdropping can be performed without advanced technological devices due to the
open nature of wireless channels [3]. In principle, even legitimate users in wireless
networks could be considered as potential eavesdroppers [3]. Based on the aforemen-
tioned security issues, solutions can be adopted in different layers. Fig. 1.1 shows
the different layer protocols taken into consideration in wireless communications
and their functions. Channel coding and spread-spectrum modulation techniques
are implemented at the Physical (PHY) layer, and guarantee that all the upper
layers operate in an error-free environment as well as mitigate channel jamming, re-
spectively. In addition, admission control is tackled at the Medium Access Control
(MAC) layer, where authentication mechanisms are implemented to prevent illegal
2
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Figure 1.2: Encryption diagram
access and message encryption is implemented at the Application layer [3].
Traditionally, confidential processing is usually achieved in the network layer of
wireless networking, like the widely adopted cryptography [4]. Fig. 1.2 shows a
conventional and simple cryptographic method that is generally implemented by
encrypting the plain message by employing private encryption keys available to the
legitimate user who employs these keys to decrypt this message. It is assumed that
these keys are computationally intractable for the adversary to decrypt if these en-
cryption keys are not available by the adversary. However, the existing cryptographic
methods cannot handle these scenarios due to high computer computational capa-
bilities and cracking of encryption algorithms. Additionally, variety of challenges are
introduced in terms of key distribution and management to establish secure com-
munication links with the nature of wireless transmission [5].
Based on these above challenges, there exists the question of how to solve the
security problem of the eavesdropping at the PHY layer. Unlike cryptography that
the difference is ignored between the received signals at different receivers, physical
layer security is considered by exploiting the difference in the properties of physi-
cal channels to achieve unconditional security. As such, physical layer security is
usually performed by information theory principle, which is currently widely con-
sidered as a stronger notion than computational security. The explosive growth of
wireless applications, coupled with information privacy will indicate a bright future
for physical layer security.
However, with the ever-increasing demand of wireless access users, multi-antenna
transmission has been considered as one of effective approaches to improve the ca-
pacity of wireless networks [6–9]. Multi-antenna transmission techniques can be
applied in physical layer security to bring more degrees of freedom (DoF) and di-
versity gains. Moreover, low complexity transceiver will be designed by employing
3
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convex optimization techniques with and without global channel state information
(CSI). How to achieve the secure communications to satisfy spectral and energy
efficiency in multi-antenna transmission has been a hot research topic in wireless
communication. In this thesis, novel algorithms for the optimal resource allocation
for multi-antenna transceiver will be designed to realize spectral efficient, energy ef-
ficient, and secure communication networks by utilizing mathematical optimization
techniques and game theory.
1.2 Literature Review
In recent years, physical layer security has paid significant attention in establish-
ing reliable wireless links to prevent eavesdropping from illegal customers [10, 11].
Traditionally, secure communications are realized through traditional cryptographic
methods performed in the network layer. However, with the nature of wireless
transmission, various challenges are introduced in terms of key distribution and
management [12]. Physical layer security technique provides a fundamentally dif-
ferent paradigm, compared to conventional cryptographic approaches, in which se-
crecy capacity is achieved by exploiting the physical layer properties of wireless
communication system [13]. The concept of physical layer security was originally
proposed by initially defining wiretap channels in [14], and has recently been recog-
nized as a promising technique to establish secure data transmission between legit-
imate transceivers, which has been developed based on information theory princi-
ple [5,12,15,16]. Recently, secret communication for multi-antenna secrecy channels
has attracted the research community due to the advantage of having additional
DoF and diversity gains, and the achieved secrecy rates are constrained by the in-
formation rates achieved by the eavesdroppers [17,18].
Several approaches and algorithms have been introduced to improve the secrecy
rates, which consists of cooperative beamforming (CB), artificial noise (AN), co-
operative jamming (CJ), and device-to-device (D2D) transmission, etc. [11, 19–32].
Convex optimization techniques have often been employed to design the optimal
transmit beamformer by solving the secrecy rate optimization problems (i.e., power
minimization and secrecy rate maximization) [19]. Relays and jamming nodes are
introduced in the secure network, which have the capability to improve performance
at the legitimate receiver, preventing the eavesdroppers from intercepting the de-
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sired messages intended for the legitimate receivers [23, 33–37]. Moreover, secrecy
rate maximization algorithm has been proposed for multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channel, which provides the necessary sufficient conditions based
on the optimal input covariance matrix [38], whereas in [39] a full-rank optimal in-
put covariance matrix solution was presented to achieve the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. CB requires relays to forward the signal from the
source to the legitimate user based on the assumption that the direct transmission is
not available. The optimal power allocation in the context of a decode-and-forward
(DF) scheme has been proposed to maximize the sum secrecy rate [20], whereas
in [21] the relay relies on an amplify-and-forward (AF) scheme in a MIMO system,
where the source and relay beamformer have been jointly designed to maximize the
achieved secrecy rate in the cooperative scheme. For MIMO relay networks, the op-
timal power allocation has been derived by exploiting the generalized singular value
decomposition (GSVD)-based secure relaying scheme [22]. AN is also a well-known
technique, which introduces the interference to eavesdroppers by embedding noise
in the desired transmission signal [28,29]. In [28], an isotropic AN scheme has been
designed using an orthogonal projection approach, whereas the spatially selective
AN algorithm is investigated to jointly design transmit beamformer and AN covari-
ance matrix to interfere the eavesdroppers in [29]. CJ is another technique that can
be applied to improve physical layer security [23–26]. For the single-antenna case,
the secrecy rate has been maximized by employing a one-dimensional (1D) search
algorithm [23]. In [24], first-order Taylor series expansion has been applied to ap-
proximate the secrecy capacity for MIMO secrecy channel with a multi-antenna CJ,
which reformulate the non-convex secrecy rate optimization framework to a convex
one, whereas the stochastic geometry approach is appropriate to the networks where
the jammers and the eavesdroppers are deployed randomly [27]. Moreover, game
theory is a promising mathematical tool for decision making and resource allocation
in secure communications [40, 41].
In general, the CSI is assumed to be perfectly available at the transmitter be-
tween the transmitter and the legitimate receiver as well as the eavesdropper. How-
ever, it is not possible that this assumption is always valid with channel estimation
and quantization errors. Without having the CSI at the legitimate transmitter,
it is more challenging for the transmitter to perform optimization. To circumvent
these issues of imperfection, robust optimization techniques have been considered
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to incorporate the channel uncertainty [19, 34, 42–48]. The robust optimization
approaches have been applied in physical layer security based on the worst-case
scheme [19,48,49]. The bridge has been built between wiretap channel and cognitive
radio (CR) channel incorporating norm-bounded channel uncertainty [49]. In [19],
the robust transmit covariance matrix has been designed for MISO secrecy chan-
nels with multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers, and the robust optimization prob-
lem can be relaxed as semidefinite programming (SDP) by exploiting S-Procedure.
In [48], a conservative approximation approach at low SNRs has been proposed for
MIMO secrecy channel, whereas AN-assisted robust techniques has been developed
in [29,47]. In [34], a robust CJ scheme has been proposed for secure channels based
on the worst-case scheme. In addition to the robust secrecy rate optimization, the
outage robust secrecy rate optimization schemes with only statistical knowledge of
channel uncertainty have been considered in [32, 50]. The robust outage secrecy
rate optimization for MIMO secrecy channel has been investigated in [32], where
a Bernstein-type inequality based Taylor approximation was presented to handle
the nonconvex outage secrecy rate constraint, while in [50], the outage probability
minimization problem of a secrecy channel has been developed to satisfy a target
secrecy rate with the assumption that the only distribution of the eavesdropper’s
channel error is available at the legitimate transmitter.
Energy harvesting is employed in fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication
networks to circumvent the issue of energy limitations in mobile devices and im-
prove the energy efficiency of these networks by extracting energy from the external
natural environment (e.g., solar power, wind energy, etc.) [51,52].
Traditionally, energy is directly harvested from external sources without exploit-
ing the resources of the communication network itself. However, when the natural
environment is not able to provide stable energy, wireless mobile receivers have to
find an alternative energy source in the communication network. This source can be
the information-carrying radio-frequency (RF) signal radiated by the fixed transmit-
ters (base stations, hot spots, etc.) [53–55]. In this case, the role of the transmitter
is not only to send the signal to the mobile receivers, but also transfer power that
can be used to charge these receivers’ batteries. Simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) is a promising paradigm to provide power for commu-
nication devices to mitigate the energy scarcity and extend the lifetime of wireless
networks [53,54].
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Recently, secure communication in SWIPT has been investigated in [56–63].
In [56], the authors have considered a MISO secure SWIPT system. Two opti-
mization problems: 1) secrecy rate maximization of information receiver (IR) with
individual harvested energy constraints of energy receivers (ERs), 2) energy harvest-
ing maximization with a secrecy rate constraint for the IR, have been developed to
guarantee a reliable information transmission to the IR and the target harvested en-
ergy simultaneously transferred to the ERs are satisfied by optimally designing the
beamformer vectors and the power allocation at the legitimate transmitter. In [58],
the authors first addressed the secure communication system with SWIPT when
two types of eavesdroppers (i.e., passive eavesdroppers and potential eavesdroppers)
coexist. A total transmit power minimization problem was formulated to jointly
optimize the transmit beamforming, AN and energy beamforming, achieving secure
communications with a target amount of harvested power by incorporating channel
uncertainties of the idle receivers (potential eavesdroppers). While [59] considered
a multiuser MISO SWIPT system with multi-antenna energy harvesting receivers
(potential eavesdroppers) only, where an energy harvesting maximization problem
is proposed to guarantee secure communications. In addition, the authors have
shown that there always exists a rank-one optimal transmit covariance solution and
proposed one efficient algorithm to construct an equivalent rank-one optimal solu-
tion [56, 59]. However, in [56, 59], the CSI is assumed to be available, or only the
CSI of the potential eavesdropper is unavailable at the transmitter [57,58], for which
there are practical difficulties to obtain the CSI of the link between the transmitter
and the users. Furthermore, robust secure transmission for a MISO SWIPT system
have been proposed without AN [60] and with AN [61], respectively, by incorporat-
ing the channel uncertainties of all channels. In [60–62], semidefinite programming
(SDP) relaxation has been studied to solve the secrecy rate maximization problem,
however, the suboptimal solution has been proposed to guarantee the solution of the
relaxed problem is rank-one [60], whereas in [61,62], the authors have shown the op-
timal solution of the relaxed problem is rank-two, which is not exact to the optimal
condition for the SDP relaxation. In [63], a two-step algorithm with conic reformu-
lation is proposed to circumvent the rank-one solution in the MISO secure SWIPT
system, while a novel SDP relaxation is investigated to guarantee that the relaxed
problem yields rank-one solution in the AN-aided MISO secure SWIPT system. The
optimal resource allocation in the AN-aided secure Orthogonal Frequency-Division
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Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems with SWIPT was investigated in [64], where the
weighted sum secrecy rate maximization problem of the IRs subject to minimum
harvested power requirements of individual ERs, and a new frequency-domain AN-
aided OFDMA-based SWIPT to facilitate both secrecy information transmission
and energy transfer to IRs and ERs, respectively.
1.3 Main Contributions and Thesis Outline
1.3.1 Main Contributions
In this section, the main contributions in this thesis are presented, where different
transmit optimization techniques are investigated to improve physical layer secu-
rity. Secrecy rate optimization problems (i.e. power minimization and secrecy rate
maximization) are formulated to design the secure transmit beamformer, achieving
the optimal power allocation by mathematical optimization techniques and game
theory.
Chapter 4 investigates the transmit optimization for MISO secure channels with mul-
tiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. First, second-order cone programming (SOCP)
reformulation is proposed to relax the power minimization problem. Additionally,
a closed-form solution is derived for a special case with single multi-antenna eaves-
dropper by exploiting Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Besides, the robust
schemes with secrecy rate outage probability constraint are considered incorporat-
ing statistical channel uncertainty, where the outage probability constraint requires
that the achieved secrecy rate exceeds certain thresholds with high probability such
that naturally ensure the desired robustness. Due to nonconvex problem, a two-step
algorithm with two conservative reformulations is proposed to reformulate it into a
convex optimization framework. An initial proof shows the solution to each refor-
mulated problem returns rank-one, which, therefore, guarantees that its solution is
also optimal to the original problem.
Chapter 5 studies CJ-aided transmit optimization for MIMO wiretap channel, where
a multi-antenna CJ is introduced to provide jamming service to introduce the extra
interference to the eavesdropper. Both transmit covariance matrices of the legiti-
mate transmitter and the CJ are designed, alternatively, to obtain the optimal power
allocation for the secrecy rate optimization problems, where first-order Taylor ap-
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proximation is considered to handle the nonconvex secrecy rate constraint. The
robust scheme is formulated by incorporating norm-bounded channel uncertainty.
By exploiting linear matrix transformation, it can be reformulated as convex opti-
mization framework by employing SDP relaxation. Moreover, game theory based
secure transmit optimization is developed when a private CJ is employed which
charges for its jamming service according to the amount of interference caused to
the eavesdropper. This scheme is modelled as a Stackelberg game, where the pri-
vate CJ and the legitimate transmitter are the leader and follower of the game,
respectively, and both of them are to maximize their own revenue functions. For the
proposed game, Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically derived in terms of closed-
form solutions.
Chapter 6 investigates transmit optimization for secure MISO SWIPT system. First,
secure transmit beamformer are designed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate, sub-
jecting to the transmit power and the EH constraint. A two-step algorithm with
conic reformulation is considered to handle the nonconvex secrecy rate constraint,
and first-order Taylor approximation is employed to linearize the EH constraint.
In addition, AN-aided transmit optimization is considered to further improve the
achieved secrecy rate. Secure transmit beamformer and AN are jointly designed.
SDP relaxation based two-level optimization and successive convex approximation
(SCA) are proposed to relax the secrecy rate maximization problem. Besides, it is
shown that the relaxed problem yields a rank-one solution, which, therefore, guar-
antees that its solution is also optimal to the original problem.
1.3.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 outlines the motivations of this thesis and literature review. Chapter
2 provides preliminaries. Chapter 3 introduces some basic concepts of convex op-
timization techniques. Some generic convex problems will be given. Additionally,
the dual principle is provided by the Lagrange dual function, with KKT conditions.
Chapter 4 investigates transmit optimization for MISO secure channel with multiple
multi-antenna eavesdroppers. Chapter 5 investigates transmit optimization for CJ-
aided MIMO secrecy channel, where a multi-antenna CJ is considered to provide the
jamming service to improve secure communication. Chapter 6 investigates transmit
optimization for secure MISO SWIPT system. Chapter 7 draws the conclusions,
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter outlines fundamental concepts and results of multi-antenna transmis-
sion and information-theoretical security techniques. First, multi-antenna wireless
communications is studied, which includes multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wireless communications and beamforming techniques. Then the basic information-
theoretical concepts are introduced briefly, which takes a three-node wiretap channel
as an example. Unlike traditional approaches, which handle security at the net-
work layer, physical layer security aims at developing effective secure communication
schemes exploiting the properties of the physical layer, which plays a significant role
in improving security performance from information-theoretical aspects. Finally, the
information-theoretical security for multiple-antenna case will be investigated.
2.1 Multiple-Antenna Wireless Communications
Multiple-antenna transmission has been widely employed to improve the capacity
of wireless networks, which has been investigated in [7, 8]. Both transmitter and
receiver are equipped with multiple antennas in wireless systems, popularly known
as MIMO, has been more attractive than single-input single-output (SISO) over the
past decades with its powerful performance enhancing system capacity [9]. MIMO
technology provides a new paradigm in wireless communication system design, which
offers variety of advantages to satisfy the challenges posed by both the impairments
in the wireless channel and resource constraints [9].
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Figure 2.1: MIMO channel
2.1.1 MIMO Channel and Signal Model
In this section, the property of the MIMO channel is investigated to guarantee
communication algorithms can be designed efficiently. Fig. 2.1 shows a MIMO
system equipped with MT transmit antennas and MR receive antennas, it is assumed
to be frequency-flat fading channel, the MIMO channel at a given time period is
expressed as an MR ×MT matrix
H =

H1,1 · · · H1,MT
...
. . .
...
HMR,1 · · · HMR,MT
 , (2.1)
where Hm,n denotes SISO channel gain between the m-th receive and n-th transmit
antenna pair. In a frequency-flat fading MIMO channel, general MIMO received
signal is expressed as
y =
√
P
MT
Hx + n, (2.2)
where y ∈ CMR×1 represents the received signal vector, x ∈ CMT×1 denotes the
transmitted signal vector, n ∈ CMR×1 is additive white complex Gaussian noise
with E{nnH} = σ2I, and P denotes the total average transmit power. The total
transmit power during a symbol period can be written as the transmit covariance
matrix R = E{xxH} with Tr(R) = P . The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) per receiver
antenna can be denoted by ρ = P/σ2.
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2.2 Capacity Limits of of Wireless System
2.2.1 Mutual Information and Shannon Capacity
In this section, the backgrounds on Shannon capacity and mutual information will
be introduced, and these ideas are applied to the single-user additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel. The channel capacity was first proposed by Claude Shannon
in the late 1940s, based on mutual information through the Shannon capacity limits
[65]. The channel capacity, C, is the maximum rate at which secure communication
can be guaranteed without any constraints on the transceiver complexity. It is
shown by Shannon that for any rate R < C, there exist rate R channel codes with
arbitrarily small symbol error probabilities. Thus, for any given rate R < C and
any desired non-zero probability of error Pe, there exists a rate R code to satisfy Pe.
However, such channel codes may have a very long block length, and the encoding
and decoding are extremely complicated. In the following, the precise mathematical
definition of channel capacity will be given.
2.2.2 Mathematical Definition of Capacity
Shannon’s initial work has shown that the channel capacity has been defined as
the maximum rate to realize reliable communication. It can be simply described in
terms of the mutual information between channel input and channel output. The
simple channel model is composed of a random input X, a random output Y , and
a probabilistic relationship between X and Y that is generally characterized by
the conditional probability of Y given X (f(y|x)). The mutual information of a
single-user channel can be defined as follows
I(X;Y ) =
∫
Sx,Sy
f(x, y) log
(
f(x, y)
f(x)f(y)
)
dxdy, (2.3)
where the integral of Sx, Sy denotes the random variables X and Y, respectively,
and f(x), f(x), and f(x, y) denote the probability distribution function (PDF) of
these random variables. The log function is generally with respect to base 2. Mutual
information can be modified by the differential entropy of the channel output and
conditional output as I(X;Y ) = h(Y )−h(Y |X), where h(Y ) = − ∫
Sy
log f(y)dy, and
h(Y |X) = − ∫
Sx,Sy
log f(y|x)dxdy. Shannon have shown that the channel capacity
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is equivalent to the mutual information maximization
C = max
f(x)
I(X;Y ) =
∫
Sx,Sy
f(x, y) log
(
f(x, y)
f(x)f(y)
)
. (2.4)
In this thesis, the time-invariant AWGN channel is considered, thus, the channel
capacity can be expressed with bandwidth B and received SNR γ based on the
assumption that f(x) follows the Gaussian distribution as
C = B log(1 + γ) bps. (2.5)
2.3 Multi-Antenna Beamforming Techniques
In this section, we introduce a signal spatial filtering technique, also known as beam-
forming (beamformer), which can be achieved by combining elements from different
phased angles. Beamforming is employed at the transmitter and receiver sides to
achieve spatial selectivity. In addition, it can improve the transmit/receive gain.
2.3.1 MIMO Beamforming Design
In this subsection, the beamforming technique applied in MIMO system is studied,
where the transmit and receive beamformers are designed jointly in most of existing
works [66–68]. Either the data rate and/or the diversity performance is increased
by employing multiple antennas. Also, multiplexing performance can be achieved
by decomposing MIMO channel matrix into variety of independent sub-channels
to realize different data streams transmission independently. It has the potential to
increase the data rate up to a factor, same as the rank of the MIMO channel matrix,
compared to the single-antenna system [1]. Consider a point-to-point MIMO system,
in which the transmitter and the receiver consists of NT and NR transmit and receive
antennas, respectively. The received signal can be expressed as
y = Hx + n, (2.6)
where y = [y1, ..., yNR ]
T , and ynr (nr = 1, ..., NR) is the received signal at nr-th
receive antenna. H ∈ CNR×NT denotes the MIMO channel matrix, and hi,j is the
channel coefficients between the i-th transmit antenna and j-th receive antenna.
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Figure 2.2: Transmit precoding and receiver shaping
x ∈ CNT×1 and n ∈ CNR×1 are the transmitted signal vector and the noise vector,
respectively. Assuming that the channel matrix H is available to both the trans-
mitter and the receiver. The MIMO channel matrix is decomposed by the singular
value decomposition (SVD) as [69]
H = UΣVH , (2.7)
where U ∈ CNR×NR , V ∈ CNT×NT are unitary matrices, and Σ ∈ CNR×NT is a
diagonal matrix with the singular values δi of H. N is the number of nonzero singular
values, which is also known as the rank of H. The singular value satisfies δi =
√
λi,
where λi denotes the i-th eigenvalue of HH
H . These sub-channels are achieved using
linear transformation of the input signal and the output signal through transmit
precoding and receive shaping. In transmit precoding, the symbol stream can be
precoded as
x = Vx¯, (2.8)
where x¯ is the transmitted signal stream. While the received signal can be modified
as
y¯ = UHy. (2.9)
Fig. 2.2 shows that both transmit precoding and receiver shaping decompose the
MIMO channel into N number of independent SISO channels as shown in Fig. 2.3,
and the received signal can be expressed as
y¯ = UH(Hx + n) = UHUΣVHVx¯ + UHn = Σx¯ + n¯, (2.10)
where n¯ = UHn. Hence, this MIMO achieves up to N times data rate of an asso-
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Figure 2.3: Parallel decomposition of the MIMO channel
ciated SISO channel. Each channel performance depends on δi. Thus, the transmit
precoding and receiver shaping matrices also known as transmit and receiver beam-
formers. Provided that the MIMO channel matrix is known to the transmitter and
the receiver, the channel capacity of this MIMO system is equivalent to the sum of
capacities of each independent parallel channels.
C = max
pi
N∑
i=1
B log
(
1 +
δ2i pi
σ2
)
, s.t.
N∑
i=1
pi ≤ P, pi ≥ 0, (2.11)
where P and pi are the total transmit power and power allocated to the i-th inde-
pendent channel, respectively. B, δi and σ
2 are the bandwidth, the i-th independent
channel coefficients and the noise power, respectively. By exploiting Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [70], the following relations hold:
αi ≥ 0, (2.12a)
αipi = 0, (2.12b)(
B
1 +
δ2i pi
σ2
)
δ2i
σ2
+ αi = β, (2.12c)
where αi and β are the dual multipliers of i-th individual power and total power
constraints, respectively. From complementary slackness as in (2.12b) and (2.12c),
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Figure 2.4: Water-filling power allocations.
the optimal power allocation is written in terms of closed-form solution as
p∗i =

[
B
β
− σ2
δ2i
]+
, αi = 0,
0, αi 6= 0.
(2.13)
In addition, the optimal value of β is given by (2.14),
N∑
i=1
max
{
0,
(
B
β
− σ
2
δ2i
)}
= P, (2.14)
which is known as the water-filling solution shown in Fig. 2.4, in which the water-
level is equal to B
β∗ . The parameter β
∗ is the optimal value of β, which can be
obtained by solving the equation (2.14).
2.4 Information-theoretical Security
Information-theoretical security is a new paradigm that potentially strengthen the
security of existing systems by introducing a level of information theory principle.
This has been widely considered as a stronger notion than computational security
[3, 5, 12, 17,71].
2.4.1 Information-Theoretical Security
Information-theoretical security, mainly focuses on the secure transmission analysis
based on the information theory principles [72], where this principle was first pro-
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Figure 2.5: Shannon secrecy model
posed in communication theory, which introduced a Shannon secrecy model shown
in Fig. 2.5. In this secrecy model, it consists of the legitimate transmitter (i.e.,
Alice), the legitimate user (i.e., Bob) and the eavesdropper (i.e., Eve). Eve can ac-
cess to the insecure channel and eavesdrops the same messages to Bob by achieving
the cryptogram C, where C is a function of the plaintext M and a secret key K,
generated by key generator and shared by Alice and Bob. According to Shannon’s
definition, this system is perfect if the following equality holds
I(M ;C) = 0,
which implies Eve has no knowledge of M with knowing C [3].
However, Shannon’s secrecy system model leads to the fact that it is assumed
that the channel from Alice to Eve has the same capacity as the channel from Alice
to Bob, since Eve can access to the cryptogram perfectly. Therefore, the key is
employed to guarantee perfect secrecy transmission is to modify Shannons model
such that the Eve cannot achieve the same information as Bob.
Based on this motivation, a novel secrecy system, named wiretap channel, was
initially proposed in [14], and then further developed in [73]. Fig. 2.6 shows a
simple wiretap channel, where Alice transmits the confidential message to Bob,
whereas Eve can access to the messages received by the legitimate receiver. In
[73], a broadcast channel with confidential messages is described (c.f. Fig. 2.7),
where Alice communicates with Bob via a discrete broadcast channel explained by a
discrete input alphabet X, two discrete output alphabets Y and Z, and a probability
transition function pY Z|X(y, z|x). It is assumed that this channel is memoryless,
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Figure 2.6: Simple wiretap channel
thus, the transition probability of a sequence of n symbols is expressed as
p(yn, zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
pY Z|X(yi, zi|xi) (2.15)
Alice sends a common message S0 to both Bob and Eve as well as a private message
SM to Bob only.
Definition A (2nR0 , 2nRM , n) code for the broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages consists of the following statements:
• Two message sets S0 = {1, 2, ..., 2nR0} and SM = {1, 2, ..., 2nRM}.
• An encoding function fn : S0 × SM → Xn, which maps each message pair
(s0, sM) ∈ S0 × SM to a codeword xn ∈ Xn.
• Two decoding functions gn : Yn → S0 × SM and hn : Zn → S0, which map an
observation yn to a message pair (sˆ0, sˆM) and an observation z
n to a message
s˜0.
The confidential message SM with respect to the eavesdropper is measured by
equivocation rate:
1
n
H(SM |Zn) (2.16)
The rate set (R0, RM , RE) is achieved rate for the broadcast channel with confidential
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Figure 2.7: Broadcast wiretap channel with confidential message
message, if and only if, for any  > 0, there exists a (2nR0 , 2nRM , n) code such that
P [gn(Y
n) 6= (S0, SM) or hn(Zn 6= S0)] < ,
1
n
H(SM |Zn) ≥ RE − .
The above two inequalities represent reliability and secrecy conditions, which are
not a priori obvious that both conditions are satisfied simultaneously. In addition,
the trade-off between reliability and secrecy can be characterized exactly as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 [73, Theorem 1] The closed convex set of achievable rates (R0, RM , RE)
is given as follows:
C = ∪U→V→X→Y Z

0 ≤ RE ≤ RM ,
RE ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
R0 +RM ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min(I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)),
0 ≤ R0 ≤ min(I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)).
(2.17)
From the above theorem, it is easy to define a metric characterization of the information-
theoretical security for a channel, secrecy capacity of a broadcast channel with con-
fidential messages, which can be defined as the upper bound of all rates RM such
that (0, RM , RM) is achievable. This metric explains the usual channel capacity,
which only considers reliable communications without secrecy constraints. Hence,
the following corollary is considered:
Corollary 2.1 [73, Corollary 2] In a broadcast channel with confidential messages,
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Figure 2.8: Gaussian wiretap channel
the secrecy capacity can be written as
C = max
V→X→Y Z
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]. (2.18)
The secrecy capacity can be computed by the Corollary 2.1 for any discrete memo-
ryless channel, and it can also be applied in continuous memoryless channels. The
secrecy capacity is dependent on the channel transition probability only through the
marginal probabilities pY |X(y|x) and pZ|X(z|x). However, it employs the maximiza-
tion to meet a Markov chain condition, which is not practical [3].
2.4.2 Gaussian Wiretap Channel
In this subsection, a simple, practical and useful wiretap channel is considered,
Gaussian wiretap channel, which is described in Fig. 2.8. From this figure, it is
assumed that both main and eavesdropping channels are additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels with channel gains hS and hE, respectively, whereas the
noise powers of these Gaussian noises NS and NE are denoted by σ
2
S and σ
2
E, re-
spectively. In addition, assuming that the messages transmitted over the channels
are subject to the average transmit power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(Xi) ≤ P. (2.19)
Based on these assumptions, the following theorem can be given:
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Theorem 2.2 [12,71,74] The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is
written as
C =
[
log
(
1 +
hSP
σ2S
)
− log
(
1 +
hEP
σ2E
)]+
. (2.20)
Theorem 2.2 confirms that there exists a coding scheme guaranteeing information-
theoretic security, if the legitimate receiver outperforms that of the eavesdropper in
terms of SNR, and the maximum secrecy rate is the difference between the main
channel capacity and the eavesdropping channel capacity.
2.5 Secure Communications for Multiple-Antenna
Transceiver
In this section, secure communications for multiple-antenna cases are studied, where
the transceivers (i.e., transmitter, receiver or/and eavesdropper) are equipped with
multiple antenna. Multi-antenna secure communications have been widely focused
in some existing works [17,18,48,75,76].
2.5.1 Transmit Optimization for MIMO Wiretap Channel
In this subsection, transmit optimization for MIMO wiretap channel is investigated
[48], where a legitimate transmitter establishes a secure communication link with a
legitimate user for data transmission with a multi-antenna eavesdropper. Assuming
that the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate user consists of NT transmit and
NR receive antennas, respectively, whereas the eavesdropper is equipped with NE
receive antennas. The channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and
the legitimate receiver as well as the eavesdropper are represented by Hs ∈ CNT×NR
and He ∈ CNT×NE , respectively. The maximum transmit power available at the
legitimate transmitter is denoted by P . The received signal at the legitimate user
is written as
ys = H
H
s x + ns, ye = H
H
s x + ne, (2.21)
where x ∈ CNT×1 denotes the desired signal intended to the legitimate receiver. The
transmit covariance matrix is defined as Qs = E{xxH}. The noises, ns and ne, are
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set to be zero-mean circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with covari-
ances σ2sI ∈ CNR×NR and σ2eI ∈ CNE×NE , respectively. The achievable transmission
rate to the legitimate user and the eavesdropper can be expressed, respectively, as [7]
Rs = log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2s HHs QsHs
∣∣∣∣, Re = log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HHe QsHe
∣∣∣∣ (2.22)
Thus, the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver is written as [18]
R = [Rs −Re]+, (2.23)
where [x]+ represents max{x, 0}. Two secrecy rate optimization problems: a) power
minimization b) secrecy rate maximization are formulated as follows:
1. Power minimization:
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. R ≥ R¯. (2.24)
2. Secrecy rate maximization:
max
Qs0
R, s.t. Tr(Qs) ≤ P. (2.25)
Both above problems are not convex in terms of transmit covariance matrix Qs,
and cannot be solved directly. However, this secrecy rate can be linearized based on
Taylor approximation such that both problems can be recast as the convex ones. In
this optimization framework, it is first assumed that global channel state information
(CSI) are perfectly available at the transmitter. This assumption has been widely
used in recent work [19, 76, 77]. Thus, the secrecy rate can be approximated at any
transmit covariance Q˜s as follows:
R ' log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2s HHs QsHs
∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HHe Q˜sHe
∣∣∣∣− Tr
[
1
σ2e
(
I +
1
σ2e
HHe Q˜sHe
)−1
HHe QsHe
]
+ Tr
[
1
σ2e
(
I +
1
σ2e
HHe Q˜sHe
)−1
HHe Q˜sHe
]
, R˜, (2.26)
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It can be easily observed that R˜ is a concave function in terms of Qs. Based on this
approximation, the power minimization problem in (2.24) is modified as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. R˜ ≥ R¯. (2.27)
In order to solve the problem in (2.27), the following Lagrange dual problem is
written:
max
λ≥0
min
Qs0
[
Tr(Qs) + λ(R¯− R˜)
]
, (2.28)
where λ is the dual multiplier associated with the secrecy rate constraint. It is easily
shown that the strong duality holds [48], since (2.27) is convex and satisfies Slaters
condition such that the duality gap between (2.27) and (2.28) is zero. Thus, (2.27)
can be handled by finding the optimal solution of the dual problem and updating
the Lagrangian multiplier based on subgradient method [78].
To satisfy the particular achieved secrecy rate, the transmitter will be required a
certain amount of transmission power. In general, the maximum available transmit
power is limited, which leads to the power minimization problem might turn out to
be infeasible. In general, the target secrecy rate needs to be decreased such that
achieves the secrecy rate to satisfy the transmit power budget. In such cases, the
same design will be repeated with a lower target secrecy rate, which is quite difficult
to predict in advance. To circumvent this issue, a more attractive problem formu-
lation is secrecy rate maximization shown in (2.25), where transmit optimization
to maximize the achieved secrecy rate to meet with the transmit power constraint.
It is always possible that this secrecy rate maximization problem can yield a feasi-
ble solution regardless of the maximum available transmission power or the channel
conditions. The secrecy rate maximization problem (2.25) can be solved in a similar
approach to the power minimization problem (2.24).
2.5.2 Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization
In the previous subsection, the secrecy rate optimization problems has been solved
based on the assumption that the transmitter has the perfect CSI of the legiti-
mate user and the eavesdropper. However, it is not possible that this assumption
is always valid due to the channel estimation and quantization errors. Therefore,
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robust secrecy rate optimization techniques are proposed by incorporating channel
uncertainty, which can be relaxed as semidefinite programming (SDP) at low SNR
regime [48]. The imperfect CSI was modelled as the deterministic models [48,79–82],
and the statistical models [32,83]. Based on deterministic channel uncertainty mod-
els, S-Procedure is employed to remove the impact of the channel error by refor-
mulating the nonconvex secrecy rate constraint into the linear matrix inequality
(LMI), whereas the robust outage secrecy rate optimization can be solved by us-
ing Bernstein-type inequality to tackle the outage probability constraint based on
statistical channel uncertainty models.
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Chapter 3
Convex Optimization Theory
The utilization of optimization approaches plays a significant role in signal process-
ing and wireless communication [70, 84–86]. An increasing number of problems in
signal processing and communications can be appropriately modelled as constrained
optimization frameworks, which are either naturally convex or can be reformulated
into convex forms by applying some mathematical optimization techniques. Once
one problem has been reformulated into convex form, it can be efficiently solved
by employing interior-point methods [70, 87]. Convex optimization techniques have
brought many conveniences of practical interest in numerical analyses, since a local
optimality is also the global optimum for the convex problems and they are solved
in terms of polynomial time complexity. In addition, the optimal solution of a con-
vex problem can be verified by employing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
and duality gaps. Also, the existing MATLAB software and toolboxes (i.e., Se-
DuMi [88], Yamip [89], and CVX [90]) are used to solve convex problems that make
convex optimization techniques more attractive or applicable in many engineering
applications. However, most of problems are generally not convex, which cannot
be solved directly. Therefore, how to recognize the problems which can be handled
using convex optimization and how to formulate the problem into a convex form are
the key steps in the application of convex optimization techniques. In this section,
the fundamentals of convex optimization techniques will be introduced.
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3.1 Convex Set
A set S is convex if it can be written as
θy1 + (1− θ)y2 ∈ S, ∀θ ∈ [0 1], and y1, y2 ∈ S. (3.1)
A set can be defined as a convex set if all the points of a line segment are in the
same set, which is constructed by connecting any two points of this line segment
by a straight line. Every affine set is also convex, since it contains the entire line
between any two distinct points in it, and therefore also the line segment between
the points [70].
3.2 Convex Cone
A set S is defined as a cone, or nonnegative homogeneous, if for every y ∈ S and
α ≥ 0, αy ∈ S holds. A set S is a convex cone if it is convex and a cone, and the
following inequality holds for any y1, y2 ∈ S and θ1, θ2 ≥ 0
θ1y1 + θ2y2 ∈ S. (3.2)
Convex cones lead to various forms in some applications, in which the most common
convex cones are given as
1. Nonnegative orthant Rn+.
2. Second-order cone (SOC): S = {(y, x)|‖x‖ ≤ y}.
3. Positive semidefinite cone: S = {Y|Y is symmctric and X  0}.
3.3 Convex Function
A function f(x) : Rn → R is convex if domf(x) is a convex set and for all x1,
x2 ∈ domf(x), the following inequality holds:
f(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≤ θf(x1) + (1− θ)f(x2), ∀θ ∈ [0 1]. (3.3)
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In other words, f(x) is less than or equal to the value of the linear function agreeing
with f(x) at the end points for any line segment in domf(x). The function f(x) is
concave if −f(x) is convex. If f(x) is continuously differentiable, the convexity of
f(x) is equivalent to
f(y) ≥ f(x) + Of(x)(y − x) (3.4)
In addition, if f(x) is twice continuously differentiable, then the convexity of f(x)
can be given by showing its Hessian matrix is a positive semidefinite (PSD),
∇2f(x)  0, ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.5)
Therefore, for instance, a linear function is always convex, while a quadratic function
f(x) = xHAx+ bx+ c is convex if and only if A  0.
3.4 Convex Optimization Problems
A standard convex optimization problem can be written as the following form
min f0(x),
s.t. fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p, (3.6)
where x ∈ Rn is the optimization variable, the functions f0, ..., fm : Rn → R are con-
vex functions, and the functions h1, ..., hp are linear functions. In addition, fi(x) ≤ 0,
i = 1, ...,m, are defined as the inequality constraints, and hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p, are
defined as the equality constraints. If there are no constraints, then the problem can
be known as an unconstrained problem. The domain to (3.6) is the set of points,
for which the objective function and the constraints are defined as
D =
m⋂
i=0
domfi ∩
p⋂
i=1
domhi (3.7)
If a point x ∈ D is feasible, then it satisfies all the constraints fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m
and hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p. The optimal solution to (3.6) can be achieved at the
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optimal point x∗ to guarantee the following inequality holds
f0(x
∗) ≤ f0(x), ∀x ∈ D. (3.8)
In the following, general forms of the canonical optimization problem formulations
will be given.
3.4.1 Linear Programming
A convex optimization problem can be known as a linear programming (LP), when
the objective and all constraint functions are affine (linear). A general LP can be
written as
min
x
cTx + d,
s.t. Gx  h,
Ax = b, (3.9)
where G ∈ Rm×n and A ∈ Rp×n.
3.4.2 Quadratic Programming
A convex optimization problem can be called quadratic programming (QP) when
the objective function is quadratic (convex) and the constraint functions are affine.
A QP is written as follows:
min
x
xTPx + qTx + r,
s.t. Gx  h,
Ax = b, (3.10)
where P ∈ Sn+, G ∈ Rm×n, and A ∈ Rp×n. In QP, a convex quadratic function is
minimized over a polyhedron. LP is a special case of QP with P = 0 in (3.10).
3.4.3 Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Programming
A convex optimization problem is known as a quadratically constrained quadratic
programming (QCQP), when both objective and all constraint functions are quadratic,
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which can be expressed as follows:
min
x
xTP0x + q
T
0 x + r0,
s.t. xTPix + q
T
i x + ri ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
Ax = b, (3.11)
where Pi ∈ Sn+, i = 0, ...,m. In a QCQP, a quadratic convex function is minimized
over a feasible region that is the intersection of ellipsoids with Pi  0. It is easily
observed that LP is also a special case of QCQP with Pi = 0.
3.4.4 Second-Order Cone Programming
A convex optimization problem is Second-order cone programming (SOCP), in which
its standard form can be defined as
min
x
fTx,
s.t. ‖Aix + bi‖2 ≤ cTi x + di, i = 1, ...,m,
Fx = g, (3.12)
where x ∈ Rn is the optimization variable, Ai ∈ Rni×n, and F ∈ Rp×n. The
constraint ‖Ax + b‖2 ≤ cTx + d, where A ∈ Rk×n, is called as second-order cone
constraint, since it is the same as requiring the affine function (Ax + b, cTx + d)
to lie in the second-order cone in Rk+1. The SOCP (3.12) is equivalent to a QCQP
(which is achieved by squaring each constraints). Similarly, if Ai = 0, i = 1, ...,m,
then the SOCP (3.12) reduces to a (general) LP. SOCP is, however, more general
than QCQP and LP.
3.4.5 Semidefinite Programming
The conic form problem is called a semidefinite programming (SDP), when K is Sk+,
the cone of positive semidefinite k × k matrices, and can be expressed as
min
x
cTx,
s.t. x1F1 + x2F2 + ...+ xnFn + G  0,
Ax = b, (3.13)
31
3.4 Convex Optimization Problems
where G, F1, ...,Fn ∈ Sk, and A ∈ Rp×n. The inequality here is called linear ma-
trix inequality (LMI). If the matrices G, F1, ...,Fn are all diagonal, then the LMI in
(3.13) is equivalent to a set of n linear inequalities, and the SDP (3.13) reduces to LP.
3.4.6 Duality and KKT Conditions
In this subsection, the Lagrange duality is introduced, which is to take (3.6) into
account by combining the objective function with a weighted sum of the constraint
functions. The Lagrange dual problem L : Rn×Rm×Rp → R for the problem (3.6)
can be written as
L(x, λ, ν) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(x), (3.14)
where λi ≥ 0, and νi ≥ 0 are the Lagrange dual multipliers associated with the i-th
inequality fi(x) ≤ 0 and equality hi(x) = 0 constraints, respectively. The objective
function f0(x) in (3.6) is termed the primal objective and the optimization variable x
is called the primal variable. Lagrange dual multipliers λ and ν associated with the
problem (3.14) are also known as the dual variables. The Lagrange dual objective
or the Lagrange dual function g : Rm ×Rp → R is defined as the minimum value of
the Lagrange dual function over x for λ ∈ Rm, ν ∈ Rp:
g(x, λ, ν) = inf
x∈D
L(x, λ, ν) (3.15)
The Lagrange dual function is always concave regardless of whether the original
problem is convex or not, since the dual function is the pointwise infimum of a series
of affine functions of (λ, ν). The dual function g(λ, ν) yields a lower bound on the
optimal value f0(x
∗) to (3.6). For any λ  0 and any ν,
g(λ, ν) ≤ f0(x∗), (3.16)
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For any feasible set (x, λ, ν), the following inequality holds
f0(x)≥ f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(x)
≥ inf
y∈D
(
f0(y) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(y) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(y)
)
≥ g(λ, ν), (3.17)
Duality gap is the difference between the primal objective f0(x) and the dual ob-
jective g(λ, ν). When the inequality (3.16) holds with strict inequality, then it is
called a weak duality. If the inequality (3.16) is satisfied with equality, it holds
strong duality between the primal problem and the dual problem. To achieve the
best lower bound of the original problem, the following dual problem can be solved:
max
λ,ν
g(λ, ν),
s.t. λ ≥ 0, (3.18)
The Lagrange dual problem is always a convex problem, since the objective function
in (3.18), which is always a concave function, is maximized with convex constraints.
This always holds regardless of the nature of the primal problem (3.6). The follow-
ing conditions are known as KKT conditions, which confirm the optimality of the
solutions
1. Primal constraints: fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m; hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p.
2. Dual constraints: λ  0.
3. Complementary slackness: λifi(x) = 0, i = 1, ...,m.
4. Gradient of Lagrange dual function with respect to x:
Of0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λiOfi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νiOhi(x) = 0. (3.19)
For general optimization, the above KKT conditions are necessary conditions for
optimality, but not sufficient conditions. For any optimization problem, if strong
duality holds, then the KKT conditions can be satisfied, but not vice versa. However,
for convex optimization problems, if the KKT conditions hold, then the strong
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duality holds between the primal problem and the dual problem, both of which are
optimal [70].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, variety of general convex optimization problems have been studied
briefly. These problems can be effectively solved by using interior-point methods.
The concepts of Lagrange duality and KKT conditions have also been investigated.
However, this thesis mainly focus on SOCP and SDP to solve the optimization
problems in physical layer security. More details can be found in [70, 85, 87, 91,
92] about these convex optimization problem formulations, applications of convex
optimization, complexity analysis and interior-point methods.
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Transmit Optimization for MISO
Secure Communications
This chapter studies transmit optimization for a multiple-input-single-output (MISO)
secrecy channel with multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. For this chapter, the
main contributions are given as follows:
• Power Minimization: Power minimization problem is investigated based on
global channel state information (CSI), where a second-order cone program-
ming (SOCP) based reformulation is proposed to design the transmit beam-
former to minimize the transmit power while satisfying the secrecy rate. In
addition, a closed-form solution for single eavesdropper case is derived based
on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
• Robust Outage Secrecy Rate Optimizations : Robust outage secrecy rate op-
timization techniques are presented incorporating statistical channel uncer-
tainty, where the outage probability constraint requires that the achieved se-
crecy rate exceeds certain thresholds with a specific probability. Due to non-
convex problem, a two-step algorithm with two conservative reformulations
(i.e., Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure) is proposed to reformulate it
into a convex optimization framework. It is proved that the solution to each
reformulated problem returns rank-one, which, therefore, guarantees that its
solution is also optimal to the original problem.
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4.1 System Model
A MISO secure channel is considered in this section, where a legitimate transmit-
ter establishes a confidential communications link to a legitimate receiver with K
multi-antenna eavesdroppers. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter consists
of NT transmit antennas, whereas the legitimate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper
are equipped with single and NE,k receive antennas, respectively. The channel coef-
ficients at the legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper are denoted by hs ∈ CNT×1
and He,k ∈ CNT×NE,k , respectively. The received signal at the legitimate receiver
and the k-th eavesdropper can be written as
ys = h
H
s x + ns, ye,k = H
H
e,kx + ne,k, k = 1, ..., K,
where x ∈ CNT×1 is the signal vector intended to the legitimate user. In addition,
ns and ne,k are zero-mean additive white Gaussian noises with noise variance σ
2
s and
the covariance matrix σ2e,kI, respectively. The transmit covariance matrix is defined
as Qs = E
{
xxH
}
. The achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver overheard
by the k-th eavesdropper is defined as
Rs,k =
[
log(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− log
∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣
]+
, ∀k. (4.1)
4.2 Power Minimization
In this section, transmit optimization for the power minimization problem subject
to the minimum secrecy rate constraint is considered based on the global CSI, which
can be written as
min
Qs0
Tr (Qs) , s.t. min
k
Rs,k≥R, ∀k, (4.2)
where R is the predefined secrecy rate of the legitimate user. The problem (4.2) is
not convex due to the nonconvex secrecy rate constraint, which, thus, is relaxed by
the following matrix inequality [19,93]:
|I + A| ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (4.3)
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where the equality holds if and only if rank(A) = 1. If Qs is rank-one, the relaxed
problem is equivalent to the original problem (4.2), which can be written as
min
Qs0
Tr (Qs)
s.t. 1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs ≥ 2R
[
1+Tr
(
1
σ2e,k
HHe,kQsHe,k
)]
, ∀k,
rank(Qs) ≤ 1. (4.4)
Problem (4.4) is a standard semidefinite programming (SDP) by ignoring the non-
convex rank-one constraint, and its optimal solution has been shown to be rank-
one [19]. Hence, it is easily verified that the optimal solution to (4.4) is also optimal
to the original problem (4.2), which confirms the tightness of this relaxation. Ac-
cordingly, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.1 Due to the rank-one solution to (4.4), Qs can be decomposed as
Qs = ww
H , thus, the problem (4.4) can be formulated into a SOCP as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t.

1
σs
hHs w
2
R
2
σe,k
HHe,kw(
2R − 1) 12
 K 0, ∀k. (4.5)
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.1. 
The problem (4.5) is convex, which can be solved by the interior-point methods [70].
Now, a special scenario is considered by using the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 For a single eavesdropper scenario, the optimal solution can be
derived as
w∗=
√
p∗v∗, v∗=
v1
‖v1‖2 , p
∗=λ∗(2R − 1), λ∗= 1
λmax(
1
σ2s
hshHs − 2Rσ2e HeHHe )
, (4.6)
where v1 = vmax(
1
σ2s
hsh
H
s − 2
R
σ2e
HeH
H
e ).
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.2. 
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4.3 Robust Outage Secrecy Rate Optimization
In the previous section, the power minimization problem has been solved based on
the assumption that the perfect CSI of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers
can be available at the legitimate transmitter. However, it is not always possible
that the perfect CSI might be available at the legitimate transmitter due to chan-
nel estimation and quantization errors. Robust secrecy rate optimization has been
proposed incorporating channel uncertainty based on the worst case secrecy rate
in [19, 29, 48], where the channel errors were modelled as norm bound. However,
it is not possible that the legitimate transmitter always obtains these error bound
accurately. Therefore, in this section, both robust outage secrecy rate optimization
problems (i.e., robust power minimization and robust outage secrecy rate maximiza-
tion) with outage probability secrecy rate constraint are presented.
4.3.1 Problem Formulation
In this subsection, two robust outage secrecy rate optimization problems (i.e., ro-
bust power minimization and robust outage secrecy rate maximization) with outage
probability secrecy rate constraint are formulated, which are written as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. Pr
{
min
k
Rs,k ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, (4.7a)
and
max
Qs0
R, s.t. Pr
{
min
k
Rs,k ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, Tr(Qs) ≤ P, (4.7b)
The problems (4.7) can be reformulated as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t. Pr
{
log(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− log
∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, (4.8a)
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and
max
Qs0
R, s.t. Tr(Qs) ≤ P,
Pr
{
log(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− log
∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, (4.8b)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the maximum allowable secrecy outage probability for the eaves-
droppers, and P is the maximum available transmit power.
Remark For robust power minimization problem, the legitimate transmitter re-
quires a certain amount of transmit power to satisfy the target secrecy rate within
the required outage probability. However, due to insufficient transmit power or ex-
tremely worse channel conditions of the main channel than the eavesdroppers, the
robust power minimization problem (4.8a) with outage probability secrecy rate con-
straint might turn out to be infeasible. To circumvent this infeasibility issue, the
robust outage secrecy rate maximization problem (4.8b) is considered with outage
probability secrecy rate and transmit power constraints. Similar statement has been
found in [48]. Under the transmit power constraint, what the maximum secrecy rate
R is that can be achieved subject to the (secrecy) outage probability less than 100
ρ % (i.e., 100 ρ %-secrecy outage capacity) [12, 94]. In order to solve (4.8b), a two-
stage algorithm is proposed. In the first stage, for any given R that makes (4.8a)
feasible, the minimized transmit power is achieved by solving it. It is easily observed
that the optimum value of R in (4.8b) monotonically increases with the transmit
power (i.e., Tr(Qs)). In the second stage, R is updated via a bisection search [70,95].
Hence, without loss of generality, the remaining part of this chapter only focuses on
(4.8a), which can be reformulated as a convex optimization framework by employing
Bernstein-type inequality or S-Procedure, though it is non-convex.
4.3.2 Channel Uncertainty Models
In this section, two statistical channel uncertainty models are specifically modelled.
• Partial Channel Uncertainty Model : Here, it is assumed that the legitimate
transmitter has the perfect CSI of the legitimate user, and imperfect CSI of
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the eavesdropper. Accordingly, the channel uncertainty model is given
He,k = H¯e,k + Ee,k, ∀k,
where H¯e,k ∈ CNT×NE,k is the estimated CSI of the k-th eavesdropper, and
vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN(0,Re,k) are the statistical information of channel error at the
k-th eavesdropper, Re,k is a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix ( 0).
• Full Channel Uncertainty Model : In this case, the imperfect CSI at the legiti-
mate receiver and the eavesdroppers is available at the legitimate transmitter.
The actual channels at the legitimate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper can
be modelled respectively as
hs = h¯s + es, He,k = H¯e,k + Ee,k,∀k,
where h¯s ∈ CNT×1, H¯e,k ∈ CNT×NE,k are the estimated CSI, and es ∼ CN(0,Rs),
vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN(0,Re,k) are the statistical information of channel error at the
legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. In addition, Rs and
Re,k are PSD matrices (i.e., Rs  0, Re,k  0).
4.3.3 Robust Power Minimization Based on Partial Channel
Uncertainty
In this subsection, the robust power minimization problem (4.8a) is considered based
on the assumption of imperfect CSI only for the eavesdroppers, where two conserva-
tive reformulations (i.e., Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure) are employed
to make the outage probability secrecy rate constraint tractable. This robust opti-
mization problem can be expressed as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. Pr
{
log(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− log
∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ,
He,k = H¯e,k + Ee,k, vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN(0,Re,k), ∀k. (4.9)
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The above problem is not convex in terms of the outage probability secrecy rate
constraint. By considering the inequality in (4.3), the outage probability secrecy
rate constraint is relaxed as
Pr
{
Tr(HHe,kQsHe,k) ≤
σ2e,k
2R
(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− σ2e,k
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.10)
The left hand side (LHS) to (4.10) cannot be reformulated in terms of a closed-form
solution. Thus, the reformulation for this outage probability constraint is considered.
From the following matrix identities,
Vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗A)Vec(X), (4.11a)
Tr(ATB) = Vec(A)TVec(B), (4.11b)
(A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT . (4.11c)
The constraint (4.10) is written as
Pr
{
eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k + 2<{eHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+ h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k ≤ ck
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k,
(4.12)
where ck =
σ2e,k
2R
(1 + 1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)− σ2e,k, h¯e,k = vec(H¯e,k) and ee,k = vec(Ee,k). Since
ee,k ∼ CN(0,Re,k), the following transformation is given
ee,k = R
1
2
e,kve,k, (4.13)
where ve,k ∼ CN(0, I). Thus, the constraint (4.12) can be equivalently reformulated
as
Pr
{
vHe,k
[
−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
ve,k + 2<
(
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]
)
+ [ck − h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k] ≥ 0
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.14)
4.3.3.1 Bernstein-Type Inequality
In order to make the outage probability constraint (4.14) more tractable, the Bernstein-
type inequality is applied and shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 [96]: For any (A,u, c), where A ∈ CN×N is a complex hermitian
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matrix, u ∈ CN×1, x ∼ CN(0, IN) and ρ ∈ (0, 1], the following inequalities hold:
Pr{xHAx + 2<[xHu] + c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ, (4.15)
⇐

Tr(A)−√−2 ln(ρ)w + ln(ρ)y + c ≥ 0∥∥∥∥
 vec(A)√
2u
∥∥∥∥ ≤ w
yIN + A  0
(4.16)
where w and y are slack variables. The equalities (4.16) are jointly convex in terms
of A, w and y.
Based on Lemma 4.1, the constraint (4.14) can be reformulated as
Tr
[
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
+
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk − ln(ρ)yk −
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr[hsh
H
s Qs]
+ h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k ≤ σ2e,k(
1
2R
− 1), (4.17a)∥∥∥∥[ vec(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k)√
2(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k)
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤ wk, (4.17b)
ykI−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k  0, yk≥0, ∀k. (4.17c)
According to (4.17), the robust power minimization (4.9) can be equivalently written
as
min
Qs
Tr(Qs), s.t. (4.17), Qs  0. (4.18)
The problem (4.18) is convex and can be solved efficiently by using the interior-
point method [90]. In order to guarantee the optimal solution Qs to problem (4.18)
is also optimal to problem (4.9), the following theorem is provided to characterize
the rank-one property of the solution Qs.
Theorem 4.2 Provided that the problem in (4.9) is feasible, the problem (4.18)
returns a rank-one solution based on a restricted (4.17b).
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.3. 
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4.3.3.2 S-Procedure
In this subsection, another conservative reformulation based on S-Procedure is con-
sidered to handle the outage probability secrecy rate constraint. First, the following
lemma is considered to set the channel uncertainty regions for (4.14).
Lemma 4.2 [83]: Provided a set S ⊂ CN×1 with Pr{v ∈ S} ≥ 1 − ρ such that
∀v ∈ S,vHAv + 2<{vHu}+ c ≥ 0, then
Pr{vHAv + 2<{vHu}+ c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ (4.19)
From Lemma 4.2, given the following deterministic quadratic constraint
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k]ve,k + 2<{vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]}
+ (ck − h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k) ≥ 0, ∀k, (4.20)
such that ve,k belongs to the following set
S = {ve,k|Pr(vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k) ≥ 1− ρ},∀k. (4.21)
Since ve,k ∼ CN(0, INE,kNT ), it can be easily shown that ‖ve‖2 is a Chi-square random
variable with degrees of freedom (DoF) 2NE,kNT . The probability of the event
(4.20) with the channel uncertainty regions in (4.21) is 1 − ρ, thus, the channel
uncertainty regions always hold for γe,k =
√
F−1(1−ρ)
2
, where F−1(a) represents the
inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Chi-square random variable
at a. Thus, the outage probability secrecy rate constraint (4.14) is equivalently
modified as
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k]ve,k + 2<{vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]}
+(ck − h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k) ≥ 0,
−vHe,kve,k + γ2e,k ≥ 0.
(4.22)
In order to handle (4.22), the following lemma is given
Lemma 4.3 (S-Procedure) [97]: Let fk(x), k = 1, 2, be defined as
fk(x) = x
HAkx + 2<
{
bHk x
}
+ ck, (4.23)
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where Ak = A
H
k ∈ Cn×n, bk ∈ Cn×1 and ck ∈ R. The implication f1(x) ≥ 0 =⇒
f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists µ ≥ 0 such that A2 b2
bH2 c2
− µ
 A1 b1
bH1 c1
  0, (4.24)
provided there exists a point x˜ with f1 (x˜) > 0.
By exploiting S-Procedure in Lemma 4.3, the problem (4.9) can be reformulated as
min
Qs,λk
Tr(Qs) s.t.
 λkI− [R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)R 12e,k] −R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k tk − λkγ2e,k
  0,
Qs  0, λk ≥ 0, ∀k, (4.25)
where tk = (
1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k +
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
hHs Qshs − hHe,k(I ⊗ Qs)he,k. The relaxed problem
(4.25) is a standard SDP, and is solved efficiently by using convex optimization
software [90]. Besides, it can be shown that the optimal solution to (4.25) is also
optimal to (4.9) by using the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3 Provided that the problem (4.9) is feasible, the relaxed problem (4.25)
always yield a rank-one solution.
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.4. 
4.3.4 Robust Power Minimization Based on Full Channel
Uncertainty Model
In the previous section, the robust power minimization problem based on the partial
statistical channel uncertainty model has been investigated. Now, a more challeng-
ing channel uncertainty model is studied with the imperfect CSI of the legitimate
receiver as well as the eavesdroppers. Comparing with the previous channel uncer-
tainty model, it is more difficult to handle the outage probability constraint, since
the channel estimation errors of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers
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are considered. Accordingly, the problem (4.8a) is written as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. Pr
{
log
(
1 +
1
σ2s
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
)
− log
∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e,k (H¯e,k + Ee,k)HQs(H¯e,k + Ee,k)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ R
}
≥ 1− ρ,
es ∼ CN(0,Rs), vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN(0,Re,k), ∀k. (4.26)
Based on the full channel uncertainty model, (4.26) will be also solved by exploiting
Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure to make the outage probability secrecy
rate constraint tractable.
4.3.4.1 Bernstein-Type Inequality
In this subsection, the Bernstein-Type inequality is employed to tackle the out-
age probability secrecy rate constraint in (4.26), which is written by exploiting the
matrix inequalities (4.3) and (4.11) as
Pr
{
1
σ2s
[
eHs Qses + 2<{eHs Qsh¯s}+ h¯Hs Qsh¯s
]
− 2
R
σ2e,k
[
eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k
+ 2<{eHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+ h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
]
≥ 2R − 1
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.27)
The above constraint is rewritten in terms of matrix form as
Pr
{
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
H
+ 2<
{
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H
}
+ [h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H ≥ 2R − 1
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.28)
In order to handle the above outage probability constraint by the Bernstein-type
inequality as described in Section 4.3.3.1, the CSI errors of the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are written as es = R
1
2
s vs, and ee,k = R
1
2
e,kve,k, respectively,
where vs ∼ CN(0, INT ) and ve,k ∼ CN(0, INTNe,k), and set vk = [vHs ,vHe,k]H , ∀k.
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Thus, this outage probability constraint can be reformulated as
Pr
{
vHk Akvk + 2<{vHk uk}+ ck ≥ 0
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, (4.29)
where
Ak =
 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
 ,
uk=
 1σ2s R 12s Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)
 [h¯Hs h¯He,k]H ,
ck = [h¯
H
s h¯
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs h¯
H
e,k]
H + 1− 2R.
By applying Lemma 4.1, the constraint (4.29) is expressed as
Tr(Ak)−
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk + ln(ρ)yk + ck ≥ 0, (4.30a)∥∥∥∥[ vec(Ak)√
2uk
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤ wk, (4.30b)
ykI + Ak  0, yk ≥ 0,∀k. (4.30c)
Thus, replacing the constraints (4.27) with (4.30), the problem (4.26) is reformulated
as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. (4.30), ∀k. (4.31)
The problem (4.31) is convex, which can be solved by using interior-point methods.
With more complex structure of the problem (4.31), it is more challenging to directly
prove a rank-one solution of Qs. However, the following theorem is provided to
guarantee a rank-one solution to (4.31).
Theorem 4.4 Provided that the problem in (4.26) is feasible, the reformulated prob-
lem (4.31) yields a rank-one solution subject to a restricted (4.30b).
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.5. 
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4.3.4.2 S-Procedure
In this subsection, S-Procedure based reformulation is considered, where the problem
(4.26) is expressed as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. Pr
{
1
σ2s
(h¯Hs Qsh¯s + 2<{eHs Qsh¯s}+ eHs Qses)−
2R
σ2e,k
[h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
+ 2<{ee,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+ eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k] ≥ 2R − 1
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.32)
In order to tackle the outage probability constraint (4.32), es = R
1
2
s vs and ee,k =
R
1
2
e,kve,k are considered, respectively, where vs ∼ CN(0, INT ) and ve,k ∼ CN(0, INTNE,k),
and thus (4.32) is reformulated as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. Pr
{
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs+2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+h¯Hs Qsh¯s)−
2R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k
+ 2<{vHe,kR
1
2
s (I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+ h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≥2R − 1
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (4.33)
From [98], the channel uncertainty regions are equivalently defined as follows:
⇒ Rs = {vs : vHs vs ≤ γ2s}, Re,k = {ve,k : vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k}, (4.34)
where γs =
√
F−1s (1−ρ)
2
and γe,k =
√
F−1e (1−ρ)
2
; F−1s and F
−1
e are the inverse cumula-
tive density function (CDF) of the Chi-squared distributed variables with DoF 2NT
and 2NTNE,k, respectively. Thus, the following problem is given
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t.
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs+2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+h¯Hs Qsh¯s)−
2R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k
+ 2<{vHe,kR
1
2
s (I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≥2R−1,
vHs vs ≤ γ2s , vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k, ∀k. (4.35)
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Here, a worst-case optimization framework is considered to reformulate (4.35), which
can be developed as
min
Qs0,ts≥0,te,k≥0
Tr(Qs), s.t. ts − te,k ≥ 2R − 1,
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs + 2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+ h¯Hs Qsh¯s) ≥ ts,
2R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k + 2<{vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}+ h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k] ≤ te,k,
vHs vs ≤ γ2s , vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k, ∀k, (4.36)
where ts > 0 and te,k > 0 are slack variables for the achieved rate of the legiti-
mate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. By exploiting S-Procedure in
Lemma 4.3, the problem (4.36) is reformulated as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. ts − te,k ≥ 2R − 1, (4.37a)
Ts =
 µsI + 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s 1σ2s R 12s Qsh¯s
1
σ2s
h¯Hs QsR
1
2
s
1
σ2s
h¯Hs Qsh¯s − ts − µsγ2s ,
  0, (4.37b)
Te,k=
µkI− 2Rσ2e,kR 12e,k(I⊗Qs)R 12e,k − 2Rσ2e,kR 12e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
− 2R
σ2e,k
h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k te,k− 2
R
σ2e,k
h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k−µe,kγ2e,k
0, (4.37c)
µs ≥ 0, µe,k ≥ 0, ∀k. (4.37d)
The problem (4.37) is a SDP, which can be solved efficiently by interior-point
method, and the following theorem is given to confirm that (4.37) returns a rank-one
solution
Theorem 4.5 The optimal solution to problem (4.37) can be proven to be rank-one
provided that problem (4.26) is feasible.
Proof Please refer to Section 4.6.6.
4.4 Simulation Results
Simulation results are provided to validate the theoretical results to the proposed
schemes in this section. To evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, the
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system consists of one multi-antenna legitimate transmitter, one single-antenna legit-
imate receiver and three multi-antenna eavesdroppers. Additionally, the legitimate
transmitter is equipped with five antennas (i.e., NT = 5), whereas each eavesdropper
consists of three antennas (i.e., NE,k = 3, ∀k). The maximum available transmit
power is assumed to be 10 dB unless specified. All channel coefficients are generated
using zero-mean circularly symmetric independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
complex Gaussian random variables, and the noise powers at the legitimate user and
the eavesdroppers are set to be one (i.e., σ2s = σ
2
e,k = 1). The outage probability is
set to be ρ = 0.05.
4.4.1 Power Minimization
First, simulation results are given to confirm the closed-form solution derived in
(4.6), where the power minimization problem is formulated as a SOCP. The transmit
power is achieved by solving the SOCP, the SDP and closed-form expression for five
different random channels as shown in Table 4.1, where the target secrecy rate is set
to be 2 bps/Hz. From this table, it can be observed that the results of these three
schemes are the same, which confirms the closed-form solution and the SOCP.
Channels Closed-form
Convex optimization
SOCP SDP in [19]
Channel 1 1.8081 1.8081 1.8081
Channel 2 1.4943 1.4943 1.4943
Channel 3 1.1292 1.1292 1.1292
Channel 4 0.6896 0.6896 0.6896
Channel 5 1.6659 1.6659 1.6659
Table 4.1: The transmit power for three schemes.
4.4.2 Robust Outage Secrecy Rate Optimization with Par-
tial Channel Uncertainties
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed robust outage secrecy rate opti-
mization is evaluated by exploiting channel uncertainty of the eavesdroppers. Here,
the k-th eavesdropper’s CSI error covariance matrix is assumed to be Re,k = ε
2
e,kI,
where ε2e,k denotes the channel error variance of the k-th eavesdropper. The channel
error variance is set to be ε2e,k = 0.01 or 0.04 unless specified.
Fig. 4.1 shows the CDF versus the achieved secrecy rate, where the target secrecy
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rate is set to be 1 bps/Hz. It is observed from this result that the Bernstein-type in-
equality scheme can satisfy the outage probability secrecy rate constraint within the
required probability, whereas the S-Procedure scheme has a small proportion of the
achieved secrecy rates that cannot satisfy the outage constraint within the required
probability, since approximately 10 % of the achieved secrecy rates are below the
predefined secrecy rate. Fig. 4.2 represents the achieved secrecy rate with different
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Figure 4.1: The CDF of secrecy rate with partial channel uncertainties.
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Figure 4.2: The secrecy rate with different transmit powers based on partial channel
uncertainties.
transmit powers, where the achieved secrecy rate increases with the transmit power,
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and the Bernstein-type inequality scheme outperforms S-Procedure scheme in terms
of the achieved secrecy rate. The achieved secrecy rate with different error variances
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Figure 4.3: The secrecy rate with different error variances based on partial channel
uncertainties.
(i.e., ε2e,k) is shown in Fig. 4.3. As seen in this result, the achieved secrecy rates of
both robust proposed schemes and the worst-case scheme decrease with increasing
error variance. Additionally, compared with the worst-case scheme shown in [19],
both robust proposed scheme outperform the worst-case scheme, and Bernstein-type
inequality scheme outperforms S-Procedure scheme.
4.4.3 Robust Outage Secrecy Rate Optimization with Full
Channel Uncertainties
Next, simulation results are provided to evaluate the achieved secrecy rate perfor-
mance based on the full channel uncertainty model, where the imperfect CSI of both
the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers is available at the legitimate transmitter.
The CSI error covariance matrices of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are
assumed to be Rs = ε
2
sI, Re,k = ε
2
e,kI, where ε
2
s and ε
2
e,k represent the channel error
variances of the legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. Here, it is
assumed that the channel error variances as ε2s = ε
2
e,k = 0.01, 0.04 or 0.1.
The CDF versus the achieved secrecy rate is shown in Fig. 4.4, where the target
secrecy rate is assumed to be 1 bps/Hz, and the Bernstein-type inequality scheme
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Figure 4.4: The CDF of secrecy rate with full channel uncertainties.
can satisfy the outage probability secrecy rate constraint since the approximately 5
% of the achieved secrecy rates are below the target secrecy rate. However, the S-
Procedure scheme has approximately 10 % of the achieved secrecy rates that cannot
satisfy the outage probability secrecy rate constraint, which is under the prede-
fined secrecy rate. Fig. 4.5 shows the achieved secrecy rate with different transmit
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Figure 4.5: The secrecy rate with different transmit powers based on full channel
uncertainties.
powers, where the achieved secrecy rate increases with transmit power, and the
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Bernstein-type inequality scheme outperforms S-Procedure scheme. The achieved
secrecy rate with different error variances is shown in Fig. 4.6. As seen in this re-
sult, the achieved secrecy rate of both proposed schemes and the worst-case scheme
decrease with error variance. In addition, the Bernstein-type inequality scheme out-
performs the S-Procedure scheme and the worst-case scheme. Besides, the achieved
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Figure 4.6: The secrecy rate with different error variances based on full channel
uncertainties.
secrecy rate versus the number of the eavesdroppers (i.e., K) is plotted in Fig. 4.7.
From this result, the achieved secrecy rate gets decreased as more eavesdroppers
are present. Also, Bernstein-type inequality scheme outperforms the S-Procedure
scheme in terms of the achieved secrecy rate.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, different transmit optimization techniques for MISO secrecy chan-
nel has been studied. First, the power minimization was formulated into a SOCP
framework for the case of a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers, and
a closed-form solution was derived for the case of only single eavesdropper. Addi-
tionally, robust outage secrecy rate optimization problems with outage probability
secrecy rate constraint have been presented incorporating two statistical channel
uncertainty models. The robust outage secrecy rate optimization problems were
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Figure 4.7: The secrecy rate with different numbers of the eavesdropper based on
full channel uncertainties.
not convex in terms of the outage probability constraint. In order to make it
tractable, a two-step algorithm with both conservative approximation approaches
(i.e., Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure) was proposed to handle the out-
age probability constraint. An initial proof shows the solution to each reformulated
problem returns rank-one, which, therefore, guarantees that its solution is also op-
timal to the original problem. Simulation results have been provided to confirm the
performance of the proposed schemes.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, due to the rank-one solution of the problem (4.4), it can be written with
Qs = ww
H as
min
w
‖w‖22
s.t.
1 + 1
σ2s
wHhsh
H
s w
1 + 1
σ2e,k
wHHe,kHHe,kw
≥ 2R,∀k. (4.38)
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Then, the above problem can be written as
min
w
‖w‖22
s.t.
2R
σ2e,k
‖HHe,kw‖2+(2R − 1)≤
1
σ2s
|hHs w|2, ∀k. (4.39)
From the following inequality relation x
y
 K 0,⇔ ‖y‖2 ≤ x. (4.40)
The problem (4.2) is reformulated as a SOCP as defined in (4.5). This completes
the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, let w =
√
pv, the problem (4.38) for only one eavesdropper can be written as
min
p,v
pvHv, s.t.
vH(I + p
σ2s
hsh
H
s )v
vH(I + p
σ2e
HeHHe )v
≥ 2R, vHv = 1, p ≥ 0. (4.41)
In order to solve the above problem, the Lagrange dual function to (4.38) is consid-
ered, which can be written as,
L(w, λ) = wHw + λ2R(1 +
1
σ2e
wHHeH
H
e w)− λ(1 +
1
σ2s
wHhsh
H
s w)
= wH
(
I +
1
σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s
)
w + λ
(
2R − 1) , (4.42)
where λ ≥ 0 is dual multiplier with the secrecy rate constraint. The corresponding
dual problem is defined as follows:
max
λ
λ
(
2R − 1) , s.t. Z , I + 1
σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s  0, λ ≥ 0. (4.43)
In order to show the strong duality between the problem (4.38) and its dual problem,
its Hessian matrix is derived as
∇wwH = I + 1σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s . (4.44)
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The strong duality holds between the primal problem and its dual problem provided
the Hessian is a PSD matrix [99]. This will be satisfied provided that the problem
(4.38) is feasible, which implies that the strong duality holds between (4.38) and
(4.43). Thus, the optimal λ∗ is derived as
λ∗ =
1
λmax(
1
σ2s
hshHs − 2Rσ2e HeHHe )
. (4.45)
Note that the above equality can be obtained based on the fact Tr(A) ≥ λmax(A).
Thus, the minimum power can be derived as
p∗ = λ∗(2R − 1). (4.46)
In addition, the optimal w lies in the null space of Z, thus
v1 = vmax(
1
σ2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ2e
HeH
H
e ), v =
v1
‖v1‖2 . (4.47)
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1. 
4.6.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In order to show the rank-one solution to the problem (4.18), the SOCP constraint
(4.17b) can be restrictedly given by
√
‖R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k‖2F + 2‖R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k‖2≤
√
‖R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)‖2F (‖R
1
2
e,k‖2F + 2‖h¯e,k‖2)
≤
√
Tr[(I⊗Qs)(I⊗Qs)H ]
√
Tr2(Re,k) + 2Tr(Re,k)‖h¯e,k‖2 ≤ wk,
⇒ Tr[(I⊗Qs)(I⊗Qs)H ]l2k ≤ w2k, (4.48)
where lk =
√
Tr2(Re,k) + 2Tr(Re,k)‖h¯e,k‖2. By exploiting Tr[(A ⊗ B)(C ⊗ D)] =
Tr(AB⊗CD), Tr(A⊗B) = Tr(A)Tr(B) and (A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT , the following
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relations hold:
l2kNE,kTr(QsQ
H
s ) ≤ w2k, ⇒ λmax(QsQHs ) ≤ Tr(QsQHs ) ≤
w2k
l2kNE,k
,
⇒ QsQHs  t2kI, ⇒ Sk =
 tkI Qs
QHs tkI
  0, (4.49)
where t2k =
w2k
l2kNE,k
. Thus, the constraint (4.49) can be rewritten as the following
linear matrix inequality (LMI)
 tkI 0
0H tkI

 I
0
Qs [ 0 −I ]+
 0
−I
QHs [ I 0 ] ,
‖Qs‖ ≤ tk.
(4.50)
In order to further reformulate the above LMI, the following lemma is considered:
Lemma 4.4 (Nemirovski lemma) [100]: For a given set of matrices A = AH , B
and C, the following LMI is satisfied:
A  BXC + CHXHB, ‖X‖ ≤ t, (4.51)
if and only if there exists non-negative real numbers a such that A− aCHC −tBH
−tB aI
  0. (4.52)
By applying Lemma 4.4 to the LMI in (4.50),
Sk =

 tkI 0
0 tkI
− a1
 0
−I
[ 0 −I ] −tk
 I
0

−tk
[
I 0
]
a1I
  0. (4.53)
From (4.53), it is claimed that constraint (4.49) can be equivalently rewritten with-
out Qs. In order to prove rank-one of the power minimization problem, the La-
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grangian dual function of (4.18) is given in (4.54),
L(Qs,Z, λk,Ck) = Tr(Qs)− Tr(ZQs) +
K∑
k=1
λk
[
Tr[(Re,k + h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k)(I⊗Qs)]
− σ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr(hsh
H
s Qs) +
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk − ln(ρ)yk − σ2e,k(
1
2R
− 1)
]
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Ck
(
ykI−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
)]
= Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkTr(H
(n,n)
k Qs)−
K∑
k=1
λkσ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr(hsh
H
s Qs)
+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
Tr[T
(n,n)
e,k Qs]. (4.54)
where Z, λk and Ck are dual variables associated with Qs, (4.17a) and (4.17c),
respectively. In addition, H
(n,n)
k ∈ HNT×NT+ and T(n,n)e,k ∈ HNT×NT+ are block subma-
trices of Re,k+h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k and R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k, respectively, which are expressed specifically
as follows:
Re,k + h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k =

H
(1,1)
k · · · H(1,NE,k)k
...
. . .
...
H
(NE,k,1)
k · · · H(NE,k,NE,k)k
 (4.55)
and
R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k =

T
(1,1)
e,k · · · T(1,NE,k)e,k
...
. . .
...
T
(NE,k,1)
e,k · · · T(NE,k,NE,k)e,k
 (4.56)
The following KKT conditions related to the proof are considered
∂L
∂Qs
= 0, (4.57a)
ZQs = 0, (4.57b)
Qs  0, Z  0, λk ≥ 0, Ck  0,∀k. (4.57c)
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According to the KKT condition in (4.57a),
I− Z +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k − thshHs +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k = 0, (4.58)
where t =
∑K
k=1
λkσ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
. Postmultiplying the two sides of (4.58) by Qs, and based on
(4.57b), the following equality holds
(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs = thsh
H
s Qs, (4.59)
From (4.59), it is claimed that there is at least one λk, ∀k such that λk > 0,
which is shown by contradiction. If all λk = 0 for ∀k, then t = 0 ⇒
(
I +∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs = 0 (c.f. (4.59)) such that Qs = 0 due to I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 T
(n,n)
e,k 
0, which implies that the legitimate transmitter does not send any information to
the legitimate receiver. Thus, there exists at least one λk > 0 such that t > 0 holds.
According to (4.59), the following relation of rank holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
[(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs
]
= rank(thsh
H
s Qs) ≤ min{rank(thshHs ), rank(Qs)} ≤ 1. (4.60)
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
4.6.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In order to show the rank-one solution to (4.25), the first step is to write the dual
function of (4.25) as follows:
L(Qs,Z,Yk) = Tr(Qs)− Tr(ZQs)−
K∑
k=1
Tr(YkAk), (4.61)
where
Ak =
 λkI + [−R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)R 12e,k] −R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k tk − λkγ2e,k
 ,
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in addition, Z and Yk are the dual variables associated with Qs and Ak, respectively.
Then, Ak is rewritten for the convenience of notations.
Ak =
 λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k − λkγ2e,k
+ σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
]
−
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
(I⊗Qs)
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
. (4.62)
From (4.62), the Lagrangian dual function can be rewritten as (4.63),
L(Qs,Z,Yk)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
(I⊗Qs)
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
])
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k−λkγ2e,k
)− K∑
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr
(
Yk
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
])
= Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
Tr
(
S
(n,n)
k Qs
)
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k−λkγ2e,k
)
−
K∑
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr
(
Yk
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
])
, (4.63)
where S
(n,n)
k ∈ HNT+ is a submatrix of
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
Yk
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
similar to Ap-
pendix III. Next, the following KKT conditions is employed,
∂L
∂Qs
= I− Z−
[
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k = 0,
⇒ I− Z +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k =
[
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
, (4.64)
where T=
∑K
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Yk. Multiplying Qs by the two sides of (4.64),
(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs =
[
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
Qs, (4.65)
From the above equality, it is shown that T 6= 0 by contradiction. If T = 0, then(
I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs = 0. such that Qs = 0 due to I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 S
(n,n)
k  0,
which violates Qs 6= 0 due to R > 0. Thus, it is claimed that T  0, and the rank-
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one relations hold:
rank(Qs) = rank
((
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs
)
= rank
([
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
)
≤ rank(
[
0 hs
]
) ≤ 1, (4.66)
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
4.6.5 Proof of Theorem 4.4
In order to prove the rank-one solution to (4.31), first, transform this problem into
the following form
min
Qs
Tr(Qs)
s.t.
1
σ2s
[Tr(h¯sh¯
H
s Qs)+Tr(RsQs)]−
2R
σ2e,k
Tr[(h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k+Re,k)(I⊗Qs)]+ak≥0, wkI fk
fHk wk
  0, ykINT + 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s  0, (4.67a)
ykINTNE,k −
2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k  0, (4.67b)
where ak = 1− 2R −
√−2 ln ρwk + ln ρyk, and
fk =

vec
 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k

√
2
 1σ2s R 12s Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)
[ h¯Hs h¯He,k ]
 . (4.68)
The first constraints in (4.67a) can also be restrictedly modified by using the similar
approach as shown in the proof of Theorem 4.2, whilst the Hermitian matrix in the
second constraint is evidently positive definite as a result of its structure. Then, the
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Lagrange dual function to (4.67) is written
L(Qs,Z, λk,Bk,Ck) = Tr(Qs)− Tr(ZQs)−
K∑
k=1
λk
(
1
σ2s
[Tr(h¯sh¯
H
s Qs) + Tr(RsQs)]
− 2
R
σ2e,k
Tr[(h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k + Re,k)(I⊗Qs)] + ak
)
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Ck
(
ykINTNE,k
− 2
R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
)]
, (4.69)
According to the relevant KKT condition,
∂L
∂Qs
=I−
K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s −
K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
Rs+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λk2
R
σ2e,k
H
(n,n)
k +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
2R
σ2e,k
R
(n,n)
k −Z=0,
(4.70)
where H
(n,n)
k ∈ HNT+ is a block submatrix of he,khHe,k + Re,k, and R(n,n)k ∈ HNT+ is a
block submatrix of R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k. Then, setting
T = I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
2R
σ2e,k
(
λkH
(n,n)
k + R
(n,n)
k
)
−
( K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
)
Rs, (4.71)
the following equality holds:
Z = T−
( K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
)
h¯sh¯
H
s . (4.72)
From (4.71), it is easily verified that T  0 when λk = 0. Thus, only the case of
λk > 0 is considered. By setting v =
∑K
k=1
λk
σ2s
> 0, one can easily observe that T  0
and rank(vhsh
H
s ) = 1 from (4.72). Let rank(T) = rT, the following assumption is
considered:
if T  0, then this implies rT = NT , according to [101, Lemma 5], rank(Z) ≥ NT−1.
It is claimed that rank(Z) 6= NT due to Qs 6= 0. Thus, rank(Z) = NT −1 only when
rank(Qs) = 1 due to the KKT condition ZQs = 0. Therefore, the remaining part is
to show that T  0. By exploiting [101, Appendix D], it is concluded that T  0
such that rank(Qs) = 1.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4. 
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4.6.6 Proof of Theorem 4.5
In order to show the rank-one solution of the problem in (4.37), Ts and Te,k can be
modified as follows:
Ts = Ξs + V
H
s QsVs, (4.73a)
Te,k = Ξe,k −VHe,k(I⊗Qs)Ve,k, (4.73b)
where
Ξs =
 µsI 0
0 −ts − µsγ2s ,
 ,Vs = 1
σs
[
R
1
2
s h¯s
]
,
Ξe,k =
 µkI 0
0 te,k − µe,kγ2e,k
 ,Ve,k = 2R2
σe,k
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
.
Then, the Lagrange dual function to problem (4.37) is written by replacing (4.37b)
and (4.37c) with (4.73a) and (4.73b), respectively,
L(Qs,Z,As,Ae,k, νk, λs, λe,k)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(QsZ)− Tr(TsAs)−
K∑
k=1
Tr(Te,kAe,k)
−
K∑
k=1
νk(ts − te,k − 2R + 1)− λsµs −
K∑
k=1
λe,kµe,k, (4.74)
where Z, As, Ae,k, νk, λs and λe,k are dual variables associated with Qs, Ts, Te,k,
µs, µe,k, and (4.37a), respectively. The relevant KKT conditions are considered as
follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0, (4.75a)
QsZ = 0, (4.75b)
TsAs = 0, (4.75c)
As  0,Ae,k  0,Qs  0, λs ≥ 0. (4.75d)
From (4.75a),
∂L
∂Qs
= I− Z−VsAsVHs +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k = 0, (4.76)
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where S
(n,n)
e,k ∈ HNT+ is a block submatrix of Ve,kAe,kVHe,k.
Ve,kAe,kV
H
e,k =

S
(1,1)
e,k · · · S(1,NE,k)e,k
...
. . .
...
S
(NE,k,1)
e,k · · · S(NE,k,NE,k)e,k
 . (4.77)
By premultiplying Qs by both sides of (4.76),
Qs
(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k
)
= QsVsAsV
H
s (4.78)
From the above equality, one can observe the following rank relations,
rank(Qs) = rank
[
Qs
(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k
)]
= rank
(
QsVsAsV
H
s
)
. (4.79)
In order to prove rank(Qs) ≤ 1, it will be shown that rank(QsVsAsVHs ) ≤ 1 holds.
Due to (4.75c), we postmultiply VHs by the two sides of this KKT condition,
ΞsAsV
H
s +V
H
s QsVsAsV
H
s =0. (4.80)
As a result of the following equalities,
1
σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
Ξs = µs
(
Vs− 1
σs
[
0 h¯s
])
,
1
σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
VHs =
1
σ2s
Rs.
By premultiplying both sides of (4.80) by 1
σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
,
µs
(
Vs − 1
σs
[
0 h¯s
])
AsV
H
s +
1
σ2s
RsQsVsAsV
H
s = 0,
⇒
(
µsI +
1
σ2s
RsQs
)
VsAsV
H
s =
µs
σs
[
0 h¯s
]
AsV
H
s . (4.81)
Now, the following two scenarios for the equality (4.81) are provided. First, the
scenario when µs = 0 is discussed. From (4.73a),
Ts =
 0 0
0 −ts
+ VHs QsVs. (4.82)
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Assuming that rank(VHs QsVs) = rs, it thus straightforwardly follows from (4.82)
that
rank(Ts) ≥ rank(VHs QsVs)− rank
 0 0
0 ts
 = rs − 1,
⇒ rank(null(Ts))≤NT +1−(rs−1). (4.83)
Assuming that there exists at least one ξ that lies in the null space of VHs QsVs such
that Q
1
2
s Vsξ = 0. This assumption holds true, since null(V
H
s QsVs) is non-empty,
due to rank(VHs QsVs) < (NT + 1). Pre-multiply ξ
H and postmultiply ξ on both
sides of (4.82),
ξHTsξ = ξ
H
0 0
0 −ts
 ξ ≥ 0. (4.84)
It is easily verified that ξHTsξ = 0 due to ts > 0 and therefore,
∀ξ ∈ null(VHs QsVs)⇒ ξ ∈ null(Ts),
⇒ null(VHs QsVs) ⊆ null(Ts). (4.85)
According to (4.85),
rank(null(VHs QsVs)) ≤ rank(null(Ts)),
⇒ rank(null(Ts)) ≥ NT + 1− rs. (4.86)
Combining (4.83) with (4.86),
NT + 1− rs ≤ rank(null(Ts)) ≤ NT + 1− (rs − 1). (4.87)
Since TsAs = 0,
NT + 1− rs ≤ rank(As) ≤ NT + 1− (rs − 1). (4.88)
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Accordingly, As is of the following structure:
As =
NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i + βηη
H , (αi > 0,∀i, β ≥ 0). (4.89)
If β = 0, then
QsVsAsV
H
s =Q
1
2
s Q
1
2
s Vs
(NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i
)
VHs =Q
1
2
s
NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αi
(
Q
1
2
s Vsξiξ
H
i V
H
s
)
=0.
(4.90)
Together with (4.79), rank(Qs) = 0 holds, which contradicts to the optimality of
the problem (4.8a). Therefore, β > 0 and
QsVsAsV
H
s = Q
1
2
s Q
1
2
s V
H
s
(NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i +βηη
H
)
Vs = Q
1
2
s
(
0+βQ
1
2
s Vsηη
HVHs
)
= βQsVsηη
HVHs . (4.91)
One can easily observe from (4.91) that rank(QsVsAsV
H
s ) ≤ rank(ηηH) = 1.
Moreover, the case of µs > 0 is provided, since µsI+
1
σ2s
RsQs is of full-rank, according
to (4.81),
rank(VsAsV
H
s ) = rank
[
µs
σs
(
µsI +
1
σ2s
RsQs
)−1 [
0 h¯s
]
VsAsV
H
s
]
≤ rank
([
0 h¯s
])
≤ 1,⇒ rank(QsVsAsVHs ) ≤ 1, (4.92)
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.5. 
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Chapter 5
Transmit Optimization for MIMO
Secure Communications with
Cooperative Jammer
In this chapter, transmit optimization for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
secrecy channel is investigated to solve the secrecy rate optimization problems (i.e.,
power minimization and secrecy rate maximization), where a multi-antenna coop-
erative jammer (CJ) is employed to enhance secret communication in the presence
of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. For this secrecy network, the main contributions
are presented as follows:
1. Secrecy rate optimization: First, two secrecy optimization problems, namely,
power minimization and secrecy rate maximization are considered based on
the assumption that the legitimate transmitter perfectly knows the channel
state information (CSI) of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Both
optimization problems are not jointly convex due to the transmit covariance
matrices of the transmitter and the CJ. To circumvent the non-convexity is-
sues, the transmit covariance matrices of the legitimate transmitter and the CJ
are designed alternatively. For a given transmit covariance matrix at the CJ,
the secrecy rate optimization problems are reformulated into convex ones by
a first-order Taylor approximation. Then, an iterative algorithm to solve both
approximated problems is proposed based on dual problem and subgradient
method.
2. Robust secrecy rate optimization: In the previous optimization problems, it is
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assumed that the transmitters have the perfect CSI of the eavesdropper chan-
nel. However, it is generally difficult that the perfect CSI is available at the
transmitter due to lack of cooperation between the legitimate transmitters and
the eavesdropper as well as the channel estimation errors. In order to incor-
porate the imperfect eavesdropper CSI, robust optimization techniques based
on the worst-case secrecy rates is considered. An alternative optimization
algorithm is proposed, where the transmit covariance matrices of the legiti-
mate transmitter and the CJ are optimally designed, alternatively. It is shown
that the robust secrecy rate maximization problem can be reformulated into
a semidefinite programming (SDP) by exploiting the S-Procedure.
3. Secrecy Rate Maximization based on Game Theory : Finally, the secrecy rate
maximization problem is considered based on game theory, where the jammer
is considered as a private CJ who introduces charges for its jamming service
based on the amount of the interference caused to the eavesdropper. More-
over, the legitimate transmitter ‘pays’ for this jamming service to improve the
achieved secrecy rate. This secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated
as a Stackelberg game, where the private CJ and the transmitter are modelled
as the leader and follower of the game, respectively, both of them try to max-
imize their own revenues. For the proposed game, a Stakelberg equilibrium
is analytically derived where both the transmitter and the private CJ come
to an agreement on the interference requirement at the eavesdropper and the
interference price.
5.1 System Model
In this chapter, a MIMO wiretap channel is considered as shown in Fig. 5.1, where
a multi-antenna transmitter establishes secure communication with a multi-antenna
receiver in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper, and a multi-antenna CJ
assists the secured communication between the legitimate terminals by providing its
jamming service to interfere the eavesdropper. It is assumed that the transmitter
and the CJ consist of with NT and NJ transmit antennas, respectively, whereas
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is equipped with MR and ME receive
antennas, respectively. The channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter
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Figure 5.1: A MIMO secrecy channel with a CJ in the presence of a multi-antenna
eavesdropper
and the legitimate receiver as well as the eavesdropper are denoted by Hs ∈ CMR×NT
and He ∈ CME×NT , respectively. On the other hand, Hj ∈ CMR×NJ and Hje ∈
CME×NJ represent the channel coefficients between the CJ and the legitimate receiver
as well as the eavesdropper, respectively. The received signals at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are written as
yr = Hsx1 + Hjx2 + nr, ye = Hex1 + Hjex2 + ne, (5.1)
where x1 ∈ CNT×1 is the signal vector intended for the legitimate user, whereas
x2 ∈ CNJ×1 represents the jamming signal vector. nr ∈ CMR×1 and ne ∈ CME×1 are
the noise vectors at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and assumed to be
zero-mean circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with covariance matrices
σ2rI and σ
2
eI, respectively. The transmit covariance matrices of the transmitter and
the CJ are defined as Q1 = E
{
x1x
H
1
}
and Q2 = E
{
x2x
H
2
}
. Thus, the achieved
secrecy rate is written as [18]:
Rsr = [Ir − Ie]+ =
[
log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HsQ1HHs + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HeQ1HHe + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje∣∣∣
]+
, (5.2)
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where Ir and Ie are the mutual information of the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper, whereas Q1( 0) and Q2( 0) are the transmit covariance matrices of the
legitimate user and the CJ, respectively.
5.2 Secrecy Rate Optimizations
In this section, two secrecy rate optimization problems, namely, power minimization
and secrecy rate maximization are formulated. The power minimization problem can
be written as
min
Q1,Q2
Tr(Q1) + Tr(Q2), s.t. Rsr ≥ R¯sr,Q1  0, Q2  0, (5.3)
where R¯sr is the required secrecy rate. Assume that the legitimate transmitter and
the CJ have perfect CSI (i.e., He and Hje) of the eavesdropper, which can be es-
timated through local oscillator power leakage from the eavesdropper receiver’s RF
frontend [102]. The power minimization problem (5.3) requires a certain amount of
power to satisfy the predefined secrecy rate, however, it might turn out to be infeasi-
ble due to insufficient transmit power. To overcome this infeasibility issue, transmit
optimization is developed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate with the transmit
power constraint. Thus, this secrecy rate maximization problem is expressed as
max
Q1,Q2
Rsr, s.t. Tr(Q1) ≤ P1,Q1  0,Tr(Q2) ≤ P2,Q2  0, (5.4)
where P1 and P2 are the maximum available transmit power at the legitimate trans-
mitter and the CJ, respectively. Unfortunately, both optimization problems are not
jointly convex in terms of transmit covariance matrices Q1 and Q2, and cannot
be solved directly. Therefore, each original problem can be divided into two sub-
problems and design the transmit covariance matrix of the legitimate transmitter
(i.e., Q1) for a fixed jammer transmit covariance matrix (i.e., Q2). The legitimate
transmit covariance matrix can be optimally designed by a first-order Taylor ap-
proximation, which will be discussed in the following section. On the other hand,
the transmit covariance matrix of the CJ (i.e., Q2) can be optimally designed based
on a null space scheme and CJ maximization method, which will be shown in the
following.
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5.2.1 Null Space Method
In this subsection, a null space scheme is considered, where the CJ transmit covari-
ance matrix is designed to ensure that it lies in the null space of the channel between
the CJ and the legitimate receiver (i.e., Hj). Here, it is assumed that the number
of antennas at the CJ is greater than that of the eavesdropper. Thus the null space
vectors are expressed such that satisfy HjU = 0 as
U =
(
I−HHj (HjHHj )−1Hj
)
HjeD1, (5.5)
where D1 is a diagonal matrix, which controls the power allocation, satisfying the
total transmit power constraint at the CJ. Thus, the rate maximization between the
CJ and the eavesdropper is written as
max
D
log |I + V| , s.t. Tr (PHHjeDHjePH) ≤ P2, D  0, (5.6)
where D = D21, V =
1
σ2e
HjePH
H
jeDHjeP
HHHje and P = I −HHj (HjHHj )−1Hj. The
problem in (5.6) is convex and easily solved by using interior-point methods [87].
Thus, the CJ transmit covariance matrix can be obtained Q2 = UU
H .
5.2.2 Maximizing Cooperative Jammer Rate
In order to introduce more interference to interfere the eavesdropper, the rate be-
tween the CJ and the eavesdropper is maximized while minimizing the interference
to the legitimate receiver. Hence, the jammer transmit covariance matrix Q2 is
optimally designed by maximizing the difference between the jammer-eavesdropper
rate and the jammer-legitimate user rate with the CJ transmit power constraint.
Thus, the optimization problem is formulated as
max
Q20
Rj , log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje
∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj
∣∣∣∣ ,
s.t. Tr(Q2) ≤ P2,Q2  0. (5.7)
The problem defined in (5.7) is not convex due to the non-convex objective function.
Hence, the objective function is linearized by the first-order Taylor approximation
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[48] at a given Q˜2 as
max
Q2
R˜j , log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje
∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ˜2HHj
∣∣∣∣
− Tr
[
1
σ2r
(
I +
1
σ2r
HjQ˜2H
H
j
)−1
Hj(Q2 − Q˜2)HHj
]
s.t. Tr (Q2) ≤ P2, Q2  0. (5.8)
The problem (5.8) is easily shown to be convex and hence Q2 can be obtained it-
eratively by solving (5.8). The proposed iterative algorithm for optimizing the CJ
transmit covariance matrix Q2 is summarized in Table 5.1.
The approximated transmit covariance matrix Q˜2 can be updated at each itera-
Table 5.1: Cooperative jammer rate maximization algorithm
1. Initialize: Q˜2 = 0.
2. Repeat
(a) Solve (5.8) to obtain Q∗2 for a given Q˜2.
(b) Update Q˜2 ← Q∗2.
3. Until the required accuracy.
tion by Q∗2, which is obtained from the previous iteration. It is noted that Q2 is
equal to Q∗2 at the convergence of the proposed algorithm, which confirms that the
approximated rate R˜j is equal to the actual rate Rj.
5.2.3 Power Minimization with Secrecy Rate Constraint
In the previous subsections, the CJ transmit covariance matrix Q∗2 has been designed
by employing the null space method and the CJ rate maximization. Here, the
transmit covariance matrix of the legitimate transmitter Q1 is optimally designed
to minimize the transmit power such that it satisfies the achieved secrecy rate. This
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power minimization problem is formulated as
min
Q10
Tr(Q1), s.t. Rsr=log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HsQ1HHs + 1σ2r HjQ∗2HHj ∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ∗2HHj ∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HeQ1HHe + 1σ2e HjeQ∗2HHje∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ∗2HHje∣∣∣ ≥R¯sr. (5.9)
The problem (5.9) is not convex due to the non-convex secrecy rate constraint. As
discussed before, this constraint can be linearized by the first-order Taylor approxi-
mation as
Rsr ≈ log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HsQ1HHs + 1σ2r HjQ∗2HHj
∣∣∣∣+ log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ∗2HHje
∣∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ∗2HHj
∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HeQ˜1HHe + 1σ2e HjeQ∗2HHje
∣∣∣∣
− Tr
[
1
σ2e
(
I +
1
σ2e
HeQ˜1H
H
e +
1
σ2e
HjeQ
∗
2H
H
je
)−1
HeQ1H
H
e
]
+ Tr
[
1
σ2e
(
I +
1
σ2e
HeQ˜1H
H
e +
1
σ2e
HjeQ
∗
2H
H
je
)−1
HeQ˜1H
H
e
]
, R˜sr. (5.10)
The proof is similar to the proof to the problem (5.8). (5.10) is a concave function
in terms of Q1, since the first log term is a concave function and other terms are
either linear function or constant. Thus, the approximated problem is modified as
min
Q10
Tr(Q1), s.t. Q1  0, R˜sr ≥ R¯sr. (5.11)
One can observe that (5.11) is a convex problem, and can be solved by using interior-
point methods. Now, the Lagrange dual problem to (5.11) is considered, which is
written as
max
λ≥0
min
Q10
L(Q1, λ) = Tr(Q1) + λ
(
R¯sr − R˜sr
)
, (5.12)
where λ is the dual multiplier associated with the secrecy rate constraint. Since the
problem (5.11) is convex, which satisfies Slater’s condition, the duality gap between
(5.11) and (5.12) is zero, and the optimal solution to this power minimization prob-
lem can be determined by updating the dual multiplier λ by using the subgradient
method [78]. The solution to (5.11) is dependent on Q˜1, and two initializations are
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Table 5.2: Power minimization algorithm
1. Initialize: λ and Q˜1 = 0 or Q˜1 = QWF.
2. Iteration loop begin
(a) Solve the problem in (5.12) to obtain Q∗1 for a given λ.
(b) Update λ based on the sub-gradient method.
3. Until the required accuracy.
4. Iteration loop end
5. Update Q˜1 ← Q∗1.
6. Until required accuracy.
considered: a) an all zero element matrix (i.e., Q˜1 = 0) and b) a water-filling solu-
tion (i.e., Q˜1 = Q˜WF). Thus, an iterative algorithm is proposed to find the solution
to (5.9), as shown in Table 5.2.
A question may arise with regard to the problem (5.11) on whether the predefined
secrecy rate can be satisfied at the convergence of the algorithm. If Q˜1 and Q1 are
equal, then the approximated rate (R˜sr) at Q˜1 will be equal to the actual secrecy
rate (Rsr), since the fifth and the sixth terms in the right hand side (RHS) of (5.10)
cancel each other, as seen from Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3. Hence, the predefined secrecy
rate is satisfied when the algorithm converges.
5.2.4 Secrecy Rate Maximization with Transmit Power Con-
straint
In the previous section, transmit optimization was performed to minimize the trans-
mit power with the secrecy rate constraint. However, the maximum available trans-
mit power is generally limited such that the power minimization problem might
be infeasible due to insufficient transmit power. In this section, the secrecy rate
maximization problem is considered to avoid the infeasible issue, where Q1 can be
optimally designed for a given Q∗2. This optimization problem is written as
max
Q10
Rsr, s.t. Tr(Q1) ≤ P1, Q1  0. (5.13)
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The problem (5.13) is not convex due to non-convexity of the objective function.
Hence, the problem (5.13) is modified with the approximated rate (5.10) as
max
Q1
R˜sr, s.t. Tr(Q1) ≤ P1, Q1  0. (5.14)
The problem (5.14) is convex and can be solved directly. Now, the Lagrange dual
method is considered to find the solution to (5.14). First, the dual function to (5.14)
is written, similar to Section 5.2.3, as follows:
L (Q1, λ,Z) = −R˜sr + λ [Tr(Q1)− P1]− Tr(ZQ1) (5.15)
and the corresponding Lagrange dual problem is expressed as
min
λ≥0
max
Q10
[
R˜sr − λ[Tr(Q1)− P1]
]
, (5.16)
where λ is the dual multiplier associated with the transmission power constraint.
The dual problem (5.16) can be solved and the dual variable will be updated based
on the subgradient method. The proposed iterative algorithm is similar to Table 5.2.
It should be noted that Q˜1 is equal to Q1 when the iterative algorithm converges,
which confirms that both the approximated secrecy rate and the achieved secrecy
rate are the same.
5.3 Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization
In this section, robust secrecy rate optimization problems are considered for the same
secrecy network incorporating channel uncertainty. It is assumed that imperfect
CSI of the eavesdropper is available at legitimate transmitter. In the following
subsections, the channel uncertainty will be modelled and the associated robust
schemes will be presented incorporating the channel errors between the legitimate
transmitter and the eavesdropper as well as the CJ and the eavesdropper.
5.3.1 Channel Uncertainty
The imperfect CSI can be modelled based on the deterministic channel model, where
it is assumed that the true channels are centered at the mean of the channels [79].
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Hence, the actual channels can be modelled as
H˜e = He + Ee, H˜je = Hje + Eje, (5.17)
where He and Hje represent the channel mean of the corresponding channels, and
Ee, and Eje are the corresponding channel errors. It is assumed that the channel
means can be obtained at the transmitter by channel estimations. These errors are
given by defining the bounds through ellipsoid model as [70]:
ε1 = {Ee : Tr(EeP−1e EHe ) ≤ ε2e}, ε2 = {Eje : Tr(EjeP−1je EHje) ≤ ε2je},
where Pe and Pje are known positive definite matrices, which are assumed to be
identity matrices such that the channel errors are considered to be bounded by
Fronbenius norms (||Ee||F ≤ εe and ||Eje||F ≤ εje). εe and εje denote the channel
error bounds.
5.3.2 Robust Power Minimization
In this subsection, the robust power minimization problem is proposed optimally
design transmit covariance matrices of the legitimate transmitter (i.e., Q1) and the
CJ (i.e., Q2) incorporating the channel uncertainty shown in Section 5.3.1. This
robust power minimization problem can be written as
min
Q10,Q20
Tr(Q1) + Tr(Q2)
s.t. log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HsQ1HHs + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣I + 1σ2e H˜eQ1H˜He + 1σ2e H˜jeQ2H˜Hje∣∣∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e H˜jeQ2H˜Hje∣∣∣ ≥ R¯sr,
H˜e = He + Ee, H˜je = Hje + Eje, ||Ee||F ≤ εe, ||Eje||F ≤ εje. (5.18)
The problem (5.18) is not convex in terms of the secrecy rate constraint. In order
to solve this problem, two sub-problems with Q1 (or Q2) only are considered, and
an alternative optimization algorithm is presented to design Q1 (Q2) for a given
Q2 (Q1), respectively, each of which is reformulated into a SDP by exploiting linear
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Table 5.3: Alternative optimization algorithm
1. Initialize: Q2 = 0 or Q2 = QWF; Q˜1 = QWF for approximation.
2. Iteration loop begin
(a) Solve the robust power minimization problem in (5.19) to obtain Q˜∗1 for
a given Q2.
(b) Q1 ← Q˜∗1.
(c) Solve the robust power minimization problem in (5.22) to obtain Q˜∗2 for
a given Q1.
(d) Q2 ← Q˜∗2.
3. Until the required accuracy.
4. Iteration loop end
5. Update Q∗1 ← Q˜1, and Q∗2 ← Q˜2.
matrix transformations.
First, Q2 is assumed to be given to optimally design Q1 by solving the robust power
minimization problem (5.18). By exploiting the first-order Taylor approximation,
(5.18) can be written by linearizing the nonconvex secrecy rate constraint as
min
Q1,µ1,t2
Tr(Q1)
s.t. log
∣∣∣∣I + HsQ1HHs + HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣∣− t1 − log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj
∣∣∣∣
+ log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje
∣∣∣∣ ≥ R¯sr, µ1I−B1 −(QT1 ⊗ I)Ta
−aH(QT1 ⊗ I)∗ −µε2e − α1 + β1 + t1 − hHe B1he
  0,
Q1  0, µ1 ≥ 0, t1 ≥ 0, (5.19)
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where
α1 = log
∣∣∣∣I + HeQ˜1HHe + HjeQ2HHje∣∣∣∣,
β1 = Tr
[(
I + HeQ˜1H
H
e + HjeQ2H
H
je
)−1
HeQ˜1H
H
e
]
,
S1 =
(
I + HeQ˜1H
H
e + HjeQ2H
H
je
)−1
,
B1 = (Q
T
1 ⊗ I)T (I⊗ S1),he = vec(He), a = vec(S1He).
Proof Please refer to Section 5.7.1. 
Similarly, Q2 is optimized for a given Q1 by solving (5.18), which can be expressed
as
min
Q2,t3,t4
Tr(Q2)
s.t. log
∣∣∣∣I + HsQ1HHs + HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + HjQ˜2HHj ∣∣∣∣
+ Tr
[(
I + HjQ˜2H
H
j
)−1
HjQ˜2H
H
j
]
− Tr
[(
I + HjQ˜2H
H
j
)−1
HjQ2H
H
j
]
+ log(t2)− t3 ≥ R¯sr, (5.20a)
log
∣∣∣∣I + H˜jeQ2H˜Hje∣∣∣∣ ≥ log(t2), (5.20b)
α2 − β2 + Tr
[
S2H˜jeQ2H˜
H
je
]
≤ t3, (5.20c)
Q2  0, t2 ≥ 0, t3 ≥ 0, (5.20d)
where
α2 = log
∣∣∣∣I + HeQ1HHe + HjeQ˜2HHje∣∣∣∣,
β2 = Tr
[(
I + HeQ1H
H
e + HjeQ˜2H
H
je
)−1
HjeQ˜2H
H
je
]
,
S2 =
(
I + HeQ1H
H
e + HjeQ˜2H
H
je
)−1
.
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The constraints (5.20b) and (5.20c) can be converted into semidefinite constraints
similar to (5.19) as
 λ1I + (QT2 ⊗ I) (QT2 ⊗ I)hje
hHje(Q
T
2 ⊗ I) −λ1ε2je − t2 + hHje(QT2 ⊗ I)hje + 1
  0, (5.21a)
 λ2I−B2 −(QT2 ⊗ I)Ta1
−aH1 (QT2 ⊗ I)∗ −λ2ε2je − α2 + β2 + t3 − hHjeB2hje
  0, (5.21b)
where hje = vec(Hje), a1 = vec(S2Hje) and B2 = (Q
T
2 ⊗ I)T (I⊗ S2).
Proof Please refer to Section 5.7.2. 
Hence, the problem (5.20) can be reformulated as
min
Q2,λ1,λ2,t2,t3
Tr(Q2), s.t. (5.20a), (5.21a), (5.21b), Q2  0,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, t2 ≥ 0, t3 ≥ 0. (5.22)
Both (5.19) and (5.22) are convex problems, each of which can be solved to optimize
Q1 (or Q2) by the proposed alternative optimization algorithm as shown in Table
5.3. The same alternative optimization approach can also be applied in the robust
secrecy rate maximization problem, where the same linear matrix transformations
can also be employed to reformulate this nonconvex problem.
5.4 Secrecy Rate Optimization Based on Game
Theory
In the previous sections, secrecy rate optimization problems have been solved with
the help of a multi-antenna CJ. However, it is not always possible to have our own
CJ to improve the secure communications. Another option is to employ the private
CJ by paying some charges for the jamming service. The private CJ charges for this
jamming service with the amount of interference caused to the eavesdropper. Here,
the main focus is to seek optimal power allocation at the private CJ which determines
the cost needed to be paid by the legitimate transmitter. In this section, the private
CJ is considered to have single antenna for convenience. In the case of multi-antenna
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at the CJ, the corresponding beamformer will be designed independently so that the
multiple antennas scenario with a fixed beamformer can be formulated into the same
problem as with single antenna.
5.4.1 Stackelberg Game
The achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver is written with single antenna
private CJ as
Rs = log |I + 1
σ2r
HsQ1H
H
s | − log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e (HeQ1HHe + p1ggH)
∣∣∣∣
|I + 1
σ2e
p1ggH | , (5.23)
where g is the channel between the private CJ and the eavesdropper and p1 is the
power allocation at the private CJ. The private CJ aims to maximize its revenue
by selling the interference to the legitimate transmitter. This private CJ revenue
function is written as
Uj(p1, µ0) = µ0p1‖g‖22, (5.24)
where µ0 is the unit interference price charged by the private CJ to cause the inter-
ference to the eavesdropper. According to the interference requirement at the eaves-
dropper, the interference price should be decided by the private CJ to maximize its
revenue. The optimal price can be achieved by solving the following problem:
Problem (A):
max
µ0
Uj(p1, µ0), s.t. µ0 ≥ 0. (5.25)
In order to compensate for the interference charge from the private CJ, the legit-
imate transmitter pays the CJ service for maintaining secured communication. In
addition, the legitimate transmitter should maximize its revenue by introducing the
interference to improve the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate user. Thus, the
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revenue function of the legitimate transmitter can be defined as
UL(Q1, p1) = λ0Rs − µ0p1‖g‖22
= λ0
(
log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HsQ1HHs
∣∣∣∣− log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e (HeQ1HHe + p1ggH)
∣∣∣∣)
+ λ0 log |I + 1
σ2e
p1gg
H | − µ0p1‖g‖22, (5.26)
where λ0 is the unit price for the secrecy rate. Hence, the legitimate transmitter
should design the transmit covariance matrix and decide the interference requirement
to maximize its revenue. This optimization problem is formulated as
Problem (B):
max
Q1,p1
UL(Q1, p1), s.t. Q1  0, p1 ≥ 0. (5.27)
Problem (A) and Problem (B) can form a Stackelberg game, where the private CJ
(leader) announces the interference price, then the legitimate transmitter (follower)
decides the amount of interference required at the eavesdropper. The solution of
this game can be achieved by exploiting the Stackelberg equilibrium, where both the
legitimate transmitter and the private CJ come to an agreement on the interference
requirement and the interference price. The deviation of either the legitimate trans-
mitter or the private CJ from the Stackelberg equilibrium will introduce a loss in
their revenues.
5.4.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is defined as follows:
Stackelberg equilibrium: Let Q∗1 and p
∗
1 be the optimal solution for Problem (B),
whereas µ∗0 is the best price for Problem (A). The solutions Q
∗
1, p
∗
1 and µ
∗
0 can be
defined as the Stackelberg equilibrium if the following conditions hold for any set of
Q1, p1 and µ0:
UL(Q
∗
1, p
∗
1, µ
∗
0) ≥ UL(Q1, p1, µ∗0), Uj(Q∗1, p∗1, µ∗0) ≥ Uj(Q∗1, p∗1, µ0).
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5.4.3 Solution of Proposed Stackelberg Game
According to the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium shown in Section 5.4.2, the
best responses of the follower (the legitimate transmitter) and the leader (the jam-
mer) can be achieved by solving Problem (B) and Problem (A), respectively. Since,
the leader (private CJ) obtains the optimal interference requirement from the le-
gitimate transmitter, the best response of the follower (the legitimate transmitter)
should be derived first in terms of the interference price. For the proposed game,
Stackelberg equilibrium can be derived by solving Problem (B) to obtain p∗1 for a
given Q1, then the best interference price µ
∗
0 can be achieved by solving Problem
(A).
First, the interference requirement p1 can be obtained for a given Q1 by solving
Problem (B), where the following lemma holds
Lemma 5.1 The problem (5.27) for a given Q1 is a convex problem in terms of p1.
Proof Please refer to Section 5.7.3. 
From Lemma 5.1, the optimal solution p∗1 satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) condition:
∂UL(Q1, p1)
∂p1
= 0, λ0Tr[A
−1
1 gg
H −A−12 ggH ]− µ0‖g‖22 = 0, (5.28)
where
A1 =
(
I +
p1
σ2e
ggH
)
, A2 = I +
1
σ2e
(HeQ1H
H
e + p1gg
H).
From the KKT conditions in (5.28), the closed form solution of p1 can be easily
derived as follows:
p∗1 =
− c1+c2
σ2e
+
√
(c1−c2)2
σ4e
+ 4λ0c1c2(c1−c2)
µ0‖g‖2
2 c1c2
σ4e
, (5.29)
where c1 = g
Hg, c2 = g
HA−1g and A = I + 1
σ2e
HeQ1H
H
e , and the proof is provided
in Section 5.7.4. Then, the best response of the private CJ can be obtained for a
given interference requirement (i.e., p1) by solving the following problem:
max
µ0
Uj(p
∗
1, µ0), s.t. µ0 ≥ 0. (5.30)
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Substituting (5.30) with (5.29), the optimal solution of µ0 can be derived by the
following Lemma:
Lemma 5.2 The problem (5.30) for a fixed Q1 is a convex problem in terms of µ0,
and the optimal solution of µ0 can be expressed as
µ∗0 =
e
x‖g‖2 , (5.31)
where
x = −
d‖g‖2
2a
−
b2‖g‖4
4a2
+
b‖g‖2
2a
√
(b2−d)‖g‖4
4a2
‖g‖2
2a
‖g‖2
4a
= −2(d− b2 − b
√
b2 − d)
= 2
√
b2 − d(
√
b2 − d+ b), (5.32)
where a = c1c2
σ4e
, b = c1+c2
σ2e
, d = (c1−c2)
2
σ4e
and e=4λ0c1c2(c1−c2).
Proof Please refer to Section 5.7.4. 
Hence, both revenue functions of the legitimate transmitter and the private CJ
are concave in terms of p1 and µ0, respectively. This confirms that there exists a
Stackelberg equilibrium (p∗1, µ
∗
0) for the proposed Stackelberg game. To achieve this
Stackelberg equilibrium, first, the private CJ announces a relatively low interference
price µ0, for which the legitimate transmitter determines the optimal interference
requirement at the eavesdropper. Then, the private CJ increases the interference
price by a small amount provided its revenue function increases with the interference
price. Otherwise, it will reduce the interference price by a small amount. This pro-
cedure will be carried out until the maximum private CJ revenue is achieved which
is a Stackelberg equilibrium. It is noted that the deviation from this equilibrium will
result in a loss to either the legitimate transmitter or the private CJ.
5.5 Simulation Results
Simulation results are provided to validate the proposed algorithms for the secrecy
network as shown in Section 5.1. It is assumed that the legitimate transmitter and
the CJ consist of four (NT = NJ = 4) antennas whereas the legitimate receiver
83
5.5 Simulation Results
and the eavesdropper are equipped with three (MR = ME = 3) antennas. The
maximum available transmit power at both the legitimate transmitter and the CJ
is set to be 5 W. In the first set of simulations, the channel coefficients (i.e., Hs,
Hj, He and Hje) are assumed to be perfectly known at the transmitter. The noise
covariance matrices at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are set to be
identity matrices.
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5.5.1 Secrecy Rate Optimizations with Perfect CSI
First, the convergence of the power minimization problem is evaluated, where the
target secrecy rate is set to 1 bps/Hz. Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 show the convergence of
the transmit power and secrecy rate for the power minimization problem based on
the null space scheme and the CJ rate maximization with two initializations of Q˜1
(i.e., zero-element and water-filling). From both results, one can observe that both
the transmit power and the secrecy rate decrease monotonically with every iteration,
and the target secrecy rate can be satisfied when the proposed iterative algorithm
converges. Next, the convergence of the secrecy rate maximization algorithm is
shown in Fig. 5.4, where the result shows that the achieved secrecy rate and the
approximated secrecy rate increase monotonically and are equal at the convergence
of the proposed algorithm. In order to compare the performance of these two sub-
problems (i.e., null space scheme and CJ rate maximization), Fig. 5.5 shows the
variation of the transmit power with different target secrecy rates. From this result,
the CJ rate maximization scheme consumes less power than the null space scheme
for the same target secrecy rate. The difference between both schemes increases
with the target secrecy rate. Additionally, Fig. 5.6 shows the achieved secrecy rates
with different transmit powers for both schemes. As seen in Fig. 5.6, the CJ rate
maximization scheme outperforms the null space scheme.
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5.5.2 Robust Secrecy Rate Optimizations
In this subsection, the performance of the robust scheme is evaluated. The error
bounds are assumed to be ‖Ee‖2 = 0.1 and ‖Eje‖2 = 0.1. First, Table 5.4 shows
that the achieved secrecy rate of the robust power minimization, where the non-
robust scheme can be achieved by solving the power minimization problem with
perfect CSI. It is observed from Table 5.4 that the robust scheme outperforms the
non-robust scheme, implying the non-robust secrecy rate does not satisfy the target
secrecy rate, whereas the robust secrecy rate always satisfies the target rate. Also,
the robust secrecy rate maximization problem with different channels is shown in
Table 5.5, where the robust scheme outperforms the non-robust scheme in terms
of the achieved secrecy rate. Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8 show the achieved secrecy
rates of the robust and non-robust schemes versus transmit power and error bound,
respectively. From both results, it is observed that the performance of the robust
secrecy rate maximization algorithm outperforms the non-robust scheme in terms
of the achieved secrecy rate.
Random channels Robust scheme Non-robust scheme
Channel 1 1.1695 0.9848
Channel 2 1.1445 0.9753
Channel 3 1.1096 0.9966
Channel 4 1.1006 0.9875
Channel 5 1.1131 0.9682
Table 5.4: The comparison of achieved secrecy rates of robust and non-robust power
minimization scheme with target rate R¯s = 1 bps/Hz.
Random channels Robust scheme Non-robust scheme
Channel 1 2.4121 1.8112
Channel 2 3.8684 3.6255
Channel 3 2.3065 1.7519
Channel 4 3.0274 2.9007
Channel 5 1.3999 1.1407
Table 5.5: The comparison of achieved secrecy rates of robust and non-robust secrecy
rate maximization scheme.
5.5.3 Secrecy Rate Optimization based on Game Theory
Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium to the proposed Stackelberg game is evaluated.
Fig. 5.9 depicts the revenue function of the legitimate transmitter with the inter-
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ference requirement of p1. From this result, it confirms that this revenue function is
concave in terms of p1, which validates the convexity of the legitimate transmitter
revenue function. The closed-form solution of p∗1 in (5.29) is also verified by this
result. Fig. 5.10 shows the revenue function of the private CJ with different inter-
ference prices (i.e., µ0). As seen from Fig. 5.10, the private CJ revenue function
is concave in terms of µ0, which supports the convexity of the private CJ revenue
function. The optimal µ0 derived in (5.31) is validated by this result. Fig. 5.11
shows the optimal revenue function of the legitimate transmitter for a given µ∗0, and
then a corresponding optimal value p∗1 can be achieved, hence, (p
∗
1, µ
∗
0) defines the
Stackelberg equilibrium as indicated in Fig. 5.11.
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Figure 5.9: Revenue function of the legitimate transmitter.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, transmit optimization for a MIMO secure channel with a multi-
antenna CJ in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. Both secrecy rate
optimization problems (power minimization and secrecy rate maximization) have
been formulated. These original problems are not jointly convex due to the transmit
covariance matrices of the transmitter and the CJ. To circumvent this issue, these
original problems was divided into two sub-problems, where both transmit covari-
ance matrices are optimally designed by the Taylor approximation, separately. In
addition, an iterative algorithm to solve the reformulated problem is proposed based
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on dual problem and the subgradient method. Next, the robust secrecy rate opti-
mizations have been studied incorporating the channel uncertainty associated with
the eavesdropper. The robust optimization problem was developed by exploiting
linear matrix transformation. Finally, secrecy rate maximization based on Stackel-
ber game was proposed. This optimization problem was modelled as a Stackelberg
game, and the corresponding equilibrium has been derived. Simulation results have
been provided to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed algorithms.
5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Proof of Problem (5.19)
Here, the proof for the problem (5.19) is provided, which can be represented using
standard epigraph form as
min
Q1
Tr(Q1),
s.t. log
∣∣∣∣I + HsQ1HHs + HjQ2HHj ∣∣∣∣− t1 − log ∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2r HjQ2HHj
∣∣∣∣
+ log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e HjeQ2HHje
∣∣∣∣ ≥ R¯sr,
α− β + Tr[S(He + Ee)Q1(He + Ee)H ] ≤ t1,
Q1  0, t1 ≥ 0, ‖Ee‖2F ≤ ε2e, (5.33)
where
α = log
∣∣∣∣I+HeQ˜1HHe +HjeQ∗2HHje∣∣∣∣, β = Tr[(I+HeQ˜1HHe +HjeQ2HHje)−1HeQ˜1HHe ],
S1 =
(
I + HeQ˜1H
H
e + HjeQ2H
H
je
)−1
.
The above problem is not convex and it is difficult to derive the worst-case secrecy
rate in terms of Ee. The constraint (5.33) can be equivalently modified as
α− β + Tr[S1(He + Ee)Q1(He + Ee)H ] ≤ t1 ⇐⇒
α− β + hHe B1he + 2<[aH(Q1 ⊗ I)ee] + eHe B1ee ≤ t1, (5.34)
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where
he = vec(He), ee = vec(Ee), a = vec(S1He), B1 = (Q
T
1 ⊗ I)T (I⊗ S1).
In addition, the constraint eHe ee ≤ ε2e holds. In order to incorporate the channel
uncertainties in the robust optimization framework (5.33), the following lemma is
considered:
Lemma 5.3 (S-Procedure) [97]: Let fk(x), k = 1, 2, be defined as
fk(x) = x
HAkx + 2<
{
bHk x
}
+ ck, (5.35)
where Ak = A
H
k ∈ Cn×n, bk ∈ Cn and ck ∈ R. The implication f1(x) ≥ 0 =⇒
f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists µ ≥ 0 such that A2 b2
bH2 c2
− µ
 A1 b1
bH1 c1
  0, (5.36)
provided there exists a point x˜ with f1 (x˜) > 0.
By exploiting S-Procedure shown in Lemma 5.3, the constraint in (5.34) can be
written as  µ1I−B1 −(QT1 ⊗ I)Ta
−aH(QT1 ⊗ I)∗ −µε2e − α + β + t1 − hHe B1he
  0. (5.37)
This completes the proof. 
5.7.2 Proof of Constraint (5.21)
Here, the proof for the reformulation of (5.20b) and (5.20c) is provided, first, the
constraints (5.20b) and (5.20c) are written as follows:
log
∣∣∣∣I + H˜jeQ2H˜Hje∣∣∣∣ ≥ log(t2), (5.38a)
α2 − β2 + Tr
[
S2H˜jeQ2H˜
H
je
]
≤ t3. (5.38b)
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For (5.38a), the following matrix inequality is required
|I + A| ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (5.39)
Thus by employing the above inequality, the lower bound of the left hand side (LHS)
of the constraint in (5.38a) can be obtained, and this constraint can be modified as
log
∣∣∣I + H˜jeQ2H˜Hje∣∣∣ ≥ log(t2)⇒ log[1 + Tr(H˜jeQ2H˜Hje)] ≥ log(t2),
⇒ Tr(H˜jeQ2H˜Hje) ≥ t2 − 1. (5.40)
Besides, from the following matrix identities:
Vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗A)Vec(X), Tr(ATB) = Vec(A)TVec(B),
(A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT .
The constraint in (5.40) can be expressed as,
eHjeAeje + 2<
[
aH1 Aeje
]
+ hHjeAhje − t2 + 1 ≥ 0,
eHjeeje ≤ ε2je, (5.41)
where A = QT2 ⊗ I, hje = vec(Hje), and eje = vec(Eje). Similarly, by exploiting
Lemma 5.3, the constraint (5.38a) is reformulated into the following linear matrix
inequality (LMI):
 λ1I + (QT2 ⊗ I) (QT2 ⊗ I)hje
hHje(Q
T
2 ⊗ I) −λ1ε2je − t2 + hHje(QT2 ⊗ I)hje + 1
  0. (5.42)
Also, the constraint (5.38b) is reformulated into the following LMI:
 λ2I−B2 −(QT2 ⊗ I)Ta1
−aH1 (QT2 ⊗ I)∗ −λ2ε2je − α2 + β2 + t3 − hHjeB2hje
  0, (5.43)
where α2, β2, S2, hje, a1 and B2 are defined in (5.20) and (5.21). This completes
the proof. 
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5.7.3 Proof of Lemma 5.1
The revenue function of the legitimate transmitter is
UL(Q1, p1) = λ0
(
log |A0| − log |I + 1
σ2e
(HeQ1H
H
e + p1gg
H)|
)
+ λ0 log |I + 1
σ2e
p1gg
H | − µ0p1‖g‖22, (5.44)
where A0 = I +
1
σ2r
HsQ1H
H
s . In order to show that the function (5.44) is convex
with respect to p1, its first derivative is considered as follows:
∂UL(Q1, p1)
∂p1
= −λ0 ∂
∂p1
(log |I + 1
σ2e
(HeQ1H
H
e + p1gg
H)|)
+ λ0
∂
∂p1
(log |I + p1
σ2e
ggH | − µ0p1‖g‖22). (5.45)
In order to find the derivative of (5.45), the following matrix identities are required:
∂ ln(det X) = Tr[X−1∂X], ∂ ln(det AZ−1) = Tr[Z−1AZ−1∂Z].
For the term log
∣∣∣∣I + p1σ2e ggH
∣∣∣∣:
First derivative:
∂ log
∣∣∣∣I + p1σ2e ggH
∣∣∣∣
∂p1
= Tr
[(
I +
p1
σ2e
ggH
)−1
ggH
σ2e
]
. (5.46)
Second derivative:
∂2 log
∣∣∣∣I + p1σ2e ggH
∣∣∣∣
∂2p1
= −Tr
[
A−11
ggH
σ2e
A−11
ggH
σ2e
]
. (5.47)
Similarly, for the term log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e (HeQ1HHe + p1ggH)
∣∣∣∣:
First derivative:
∂
(
log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e (HeQ1HHe + p1ggH)
∣∣∣∣)
∂p1
= Tr
[(
I +
1
σ2e
(HeQ1H
H
e + p1gg
H)
)−1
ggH
σ2e
]
.
(5.48)
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Second derivative:
∂2
(
log
∣∣∣∣I + 1σ2e (HeQ1HHe + p1ggH)
∣∣∣∣)
∂2p1
= −Tr
[
A−12
ggH
σ2e
A−12
ggH
σ2e
]
. (5.49)
Thus
∂2UL(Q1, p1)
∂2p1
= Tr
[
A−12
g1g
H
1
σ2e
A−12
g1g
H
1
σ2e
]
− Tr
[
A−11
g1g
H
1
σ2e
A−11
g1g
H
1
σ2e
]
, (5.50)
where
A1 =I +
1
σ2e
p1gg
H ,A2 =I +
1
σ2e
(
HeQ1H
H
e + p1gg
H
)
.
Since the eigenvalues of A−12 are smaller than that of A
−1
1 , the following holds:
A−12 −A−11 ≤0, gH(A−12 −A−11 )g≤0,
gHA−12 gg
HA−12 g≤gHA−11 ggHA−11 g,
Tr
[
A−12
ggH
σ2e
A−12
ggH
σ2e
]
≤Tr
[
A−11
ggH
σ2e
A−11
ggH
σ2e
]
.
Hence, ∂
2UL(Q1,p1)
∂2p1
≤0, which proves that UL(Q1, p1) is a concave function in terms
of p1 for a fixed Q1. This completes the proof. 
5.7.4 Proof of Lemma 5.2
The KKT condition in (5.28) is rewritten as
λ0Tr[A
−1
1 gg
H −A−12 ggH ]− µ0‖g‖22 = 0, (5.51)
where A1 and A2 have been defined after (5.28). From the following matrix identity,
(A + bcT )−1 = A−1 − A
−1bcTA−1
1 + cTA−1b
, (5.52)
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A−11 and A
−1
2 in (5.51) can expressed as follows:
A−11 = I−
p1
σ2e
ggH
1 + p1
σ2e
gHg
, (5.53a)
A−12 = A
−1 −
p1
σ2e
A−1ggHA−1
1 + p1
σ2e
gHA−1g
, (5.53b)
where A = I + 1
σ2e
HeQ1H
H
e . Based on (5.53), the KKT condition in (5.51) can be
equivalently modified as
λ0Tr(gg
H)− λ0
p1
σ2e
1 + p1
σ2e
gHg
Tr(ggHggH)− λ0Tr(A−1ggH)
+ λ0
p1
σ2e
1 + p1
σ2e
gHA−1g
Tr(A−1ggHA−1ggH)− µ0‖g‖2 = 0. (5.54)
Setting c1 = g
Hg, c2 = g
HA−1g,
λ0c1
1 + p1
σ2e
c1
− λ0c2
1 + p1
σ2e
c2
− µ0‖g‖2 = 0, (5.55)
c1c2
σ4e
p21 +
c1 + c2
σ2e
p1 +
(
1− λ0(c1 − c2)
µ0‖g‖2
)
= 0, (5.56)
It is easy to show that
√
( c1+c2
σ2e
)2 − 4 c1c2
σ4e
[
1− λ0(c1−c2)
µ0‖g‖2
]
≥ 0 by showing c1 − c2 ≥ 0,
which holds if gH(I−A−1)g ≥ 0. Thus, I−A−1  0 can be shown as follows:
I−A−1  0,⇐ I  A−1 ⇐ Tr(I) ≥ Tr(A−1), (5.57)
Since Tr(A) =
∑NE
i=1 λi and A is positive definite matrix, and λi ≥ 1 represents the
i-th eigenvalue of the matrix A, the i-th eigenvalue of A−1 is 1
λi
≤ 1 holds if λi 6= 0
in terms of λi ≥ 1, which implies Tr(A−1) ≤ Tr(I) = ME. Thus, c1 ≥ c2 holds.
From p1 ≥ 0, the optimal solution of p1 can be derived as
p∗1 =
− c1+c2
σ2e
+
√
(c1+c2)2
σ4e
+ 4λ0c1c2(c1−c2)
µ0‖g‖2
2 c1c2
σ4e
. (5.58)
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The revenue function of the jammer can be written in terms of µ0 by substituting
p∗1 as
Uj(p
∗
1, µ0) = −
b
2a
µ0‖g‖2 + ‖g‖
2
2a
µ0
(
d+
4λ0c1c2(c1 − c2)
µ0‖g‖2
) 1
2
, (5.59)
where a = c1c2
σ4e
, b = c1+c2
σ2e
and d = (c1−c2)
2
σ4e
. In order to prove the concavity of
the jammer revenue function in terms of interference price, the second derivative of
(5.59) is written with respect to µ0 as follows:
∂Uj
∂µ0
= − b
2a
‖g‖2 + ‖g‖
2
2a
(
d+
4λ0c1c2(c1 − c2)
µ0‖g‖2
) 1
2
+
‖g‖2
4a
(
d+
4λ0c1c2(c1 − c2)
µ0‖g‖2
)− 1
2
(
− 4λ0c1c2(c1 − c2)
µ0‖g‖2
)
, (5.60)
∂2Uj
∂2µ0
= −‖g‖
2
4a
[
− 1
2
(
d+
e
µ0‖g‖2
)− 3
2
](
− e
µ20‖g‖2
)(
e
‖g‖2
)
≤ 0, (5.61)
where e = 4λ0c1c2(c1 − c2). Since, the second derivative is negative, Problem (A)
is a convex problem in terms of µ0. The optimal solution of µ0 can be derived as
follows:
∂Uj
∂µ0
= 0,⇒ µ∗0 =
e
x‖g‖2 , (5.62)
where
x = −
d‖g‖2
2a
−
b2‖g‖4
4a2
+
b‖g‖2
2a
√
(b2−d)‖g‖4
4a2
‖g‖2
2a
‖g‖2
4a
= 2
√
b2 − d(
√
b2 − d+ b). (5.63)
This completes the proof. 
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Chapter 6
Transmit Optimization for Secure
MISO SWIPT System
This chapter investigates transmit optimization for a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) secure simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) sys-
tem, where transmit beamformer is designed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate
while satisfying the transmit power budget and the energy harvesting (EH) con-
straint. In addition, artificial noise (AN) is employed to play two roles: intercept to
the eavesdroppers and harvest power to the EH receivers. In this chapter, the main
contributions are listed as follows:
1. Transmit optimization for secrecy rate maximization: First, transmit beam-
former is designed for the secrecy rate maximization problem subject to the
transmit power and energy harvesting (EH) constraints, where this optimiza-
tion problem is not convex and cannot be solved directly. In order to circum-
vent this issue, a two-step method is considered, where the secrecy rate max-
imization problem is first decomposed into a sequence of power minimization
problems for a given target secrecy rate, each of which can be reformulated as
a convex optimization framework by using conic matrix transformations and
first-order Taylor approximation. Then, this target secrecy rate is updated via
bisection search. In addition, the associated robust schemes are investigated
by incorporating channel uncertainty. The robust problem can be solved by
exploiting conic matrix transformations.
2. AN-aided transmit optimization for secrecy rate maximization: Transmit beam-
former and AN are jointly designed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate with
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the transmit power and EH constraints. Due to nonconvex problem, first,
the two-level approach is considered, where the inner level problem can be
relaxed by semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation, the outer level prob-
lem is a single-variable optimization problem, which is solved by using a one-
dimensional (1D) search algorithm. Then, a successive convex approximation
(SCA) based secrecy rate maximization problem is proposed. Moreover, the
associated robust scheme incorporating channel uncertainty is solved by ex-
ploiting linear matrix transformation. Tightness analysis for each relaxation
is provided to show the relaxed problem yields a rank-one solution.
6.1 System Model
In this section, a MISO secured SWIPT channel is considered, where it consists one
multi-antenna legitimate transmitter, one legitimate user, K eavesdroppers and L
energy harvesting (EH) receivers. It is assumed that the transmitter is equipped
with NT transmit antennas, whereas the legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and the
EH receivers each have a single receive antenna. The channel coefficients between
the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate user, the k-th eavesdropper as well as
the l-th EH receiver are denoted by hs ∈ CNT×1, he,k ∈ CNT×1 and hl ∈ CNT×1,
respectively. The noise power at the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are
assumed to be σ2s and σ
2
e . The received signal at the legitimate user and the k-th
eavesdropper can be written as
ys = h
H
s ws+ ns, ye,k = h
H
e,kws+ ne,k, k = 1, ..., K,
where s and w ∈ CNT×1 are the desired signal for the legitimate user (E{s2} = 1) and
the transmit beamformer at the legitimate transmitter, respectively. In addition,
ns ∼ CN(0, σ2s) and ne,k ∼ CN(0, σ2e) represent the noise of the legitimate user and
the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. Thus, the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate
user is expressed as follows:
Rs =
[
log
(
1 +
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
−max
k
log
(
1 +
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)]+
,∀k. (6.1)
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The harvested energy at the l-th EH receiver is written as
El = ξl|hHl w|2, ∀l, (6.2)
where ξl ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency of the energy transducers at the
l-th EH receiver that accounts for the loss in the energy transducers for converting
the harvested energy to electrical energy to be stored [101]. For convenience, it is
assumed that ξl = 1, ∀l.
Remark This system model consists of L EH receivers, which harvest power car-
ried by the RF signal without AN or with AN based on a reliable transmission
scenario. These EH receivers sometimes play a “ helper ” role by employing the
harvested power to introduce a jamming signal to confuse the eavesdroppers [103].
However, the efficiency of this harvest-and-jamming policy is dependant on the net-
work topology [104]. In this chapter, the transmit beamformer without or with AN
will be focused to maximize the achieved secrecy rate, satisfying the transmit power
and the EH constraints.
6.2 Transmit Optimization for Secrecy Rate Max-
imization
In this section, secure transmit beamformer is designed for the secrecy rate maxi-
mization subject to the transmit power and the EH constraints. This optimization
problem is written as follows:
max
w
Rs, s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l, (6.3)
where P is the maximum available transmit power at the legitimate transmitter,
and E denotes the target harvested energy of the EH receivers. The secrecy rate
maximization problem (6.3) is not convex in terms of the nonconvex secrecy rate
objective function and EH constraint, and cannot be solved directly. Unlike the
existing work [60], where the SDP relaxation is considered to reformulate the secrecy
rate maximization problem, however, it is challenging to yield a rank-one solution
for the relaxed problem. In this section, a conic reformulation for the secrecy rate
maximization problem is proposed to circumvent this issue. First, the problem (6.3)
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Table 6.1: Bisection methods
1. Given lower and upper bound of the targeted secrecy rate Rmin and Rmax, and
a desired solution accuracy τ (very small value).
2. Setting R = (Rmin +Rmax)/2.
3. Iteration loop begin
(a) Solve the corresponding power minimization problem in (6.4) using the
relaxation method to obtain the beamformer w.
(b) Compute the transmit power P˜ = ‖w‖2.
(c) If P˜ ≤ P , then Rmin = R; otherwise, Rmax = R.
(d) Until Rmax −Rmin ≤ τ , break.
4. Iteration loop end
5. R is the achieved secrecy rate of the secrecy rate maximization problem, and
w is the corresponding optimal solution.
is decomposed into a sequence of power minimization problems for a target rate
R > 0, each of which can be written as
min
w
‖w‖2, s.t. Rs ≥ R, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l. (6.4)
The optimal solution to (6.3) can be obtained by solving the corresponding power
minimization problem (6.4) with different R, which is reformulated as a convex
optimization framework by using conic matrix transformations. Then, bisection
search is employed to update this target rate R by checking the feasibility of the
power minimization problem [95]. Thus, this algorithm can be summarized in Table
6.1 to solve the secrecy rate maximization problem. In the following, the power
minimization problem (6.4) will be solved.
6.2.1 Power Minimization
Now, the power minimization problem is considered based on the assumption that
the transmitter has perfect channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate user,
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the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers. Thus, the problem (6.4) can be relaxed as
min
w
‖w‖2, s.t. log
(
1 +
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
− log
(
1 +
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)
≥ R, ∀k,
|hHl w|2 ≥ E, ∀l. (6.5)
The above problem is not convex in terms of the non-convex secrecy rate and EH
constraints. In order to circumvent the issue, the following lemma is required:
Lemma 6.1 The problem in (6.5) is reformulated into the following form:
min
w,s1
s1, s.t.
 s1
w
 K 0,
Sk =

1
σs
wHhsI
 2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12

 2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
H 1
σs
wHhs
  0, ∀k,
xl = <{wHhl}, yl = ={wHhl}, ul = [xl yl],
‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)] ≥ E, ∀l. (6.6)
Proof Please refer to Section 6.6.1. 
In problem (6.6), the secrecy rate constraint is reformulated into linear matrix in-
equality (LMI), whereas the EH constraint is approximated by a first-order Taylor
approximation, thus (6.6) is a convex problem for a given ul. An initialization value
of the vector ul is randomly generated and can be updated at each iteration. The
algorithm converges when u
(n+1)
l = u
(n)
l holds, and it is guaranteed to converge to a
locally optimal solution (quite close to the globally optimal solution) [105,106].
6.2.2 Robust Power Minimization
In the previous section, the power minimization problem has been solved based on
the assumption that the legitimate transmitter has perfect CSI. However, it is not
always possible to have perfect CSI due to the lack of cooperation as well as channel
estimation and quantization errors. In this section, the robust power minimization
problem is considered by incorporating norm-bounded channel uncertainty.
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6.2.2.1 Channel Uncertainty
In this subsection, it is assumed that the CSI is not available at the legitimate
transmitter. The channel uncertainty are modelled as
hs = h¯s + es,
he,k = h¯e,k + ee,k, ∀k,
hl = h¯l + el, ∀l,
where h¯s, h¯e,k and h¯l denote the estimated channels of the legitimate user, the k-th
eavesdropper and the l-th EH receiver, and es, ee,k and el represent the correspond-
ing channel errors, which are assumed to be bounded as
‖es‖2 = ‖hs − h¯s‖2 ≤ εs, for εs ≥ 0, ,
‖ee,k‖2 = ‖he,k − h¯e,k‖2 ≤ εe,k, for εe,k ≥ 0, ∀k,
‖el‖2 = ‖hl − h¯l‖2 ≤ εl, for εl ≥ 0, ∀l,
where εs, εe,k and εl represent the norm bound of the channel errors.
6.2.2.2 Robust Power Minimization
Now, the robust power minimization problem is written by incorporating the channel
uncertainty as
min
w
‖w‖2,
s.t. min
es
log
(
1 +
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
)
−max
ee,k
log
(
1 +
|(h¯e,k + ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
)
≥ R, ∀k,
(6.7a)
min
el
|(h¯l + el)Hw|2≥E, ∀l. (6.7b)
103
6.2 Transmit Optimization for Secrecy Rate Maximization
The problem (6.7) is not convex due to (6.7a) and (6.7b), and cannot be solved
directly. Thus, the following reformulation of the secrecy rate constraint (6.7a) as

1
σs
(
wHh¯s − εs‖w‖
)
≥ √t2,[
2
R
2
σe
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
Hw (2R−1) 12
] 2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k + ee,k)
(2R − 1) 12
 ≤ t2, (6.8)
The first constraint in (6.8) is modified based on a first-order Taylor approximation
1
σs
<{wHh¯s} − εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2), (6.9)
where f (n)(t2) =
√
t
(n)
2 +
1
2
√
t
(n)
2
(t2 − t(n)2 ). The following lemma is considered to
reformulate the second constraint in (6.8) ,
Lemma 6.2 The second constraint in (6.8) can be reformulated as
S¯k =

Sk,1 − λk
[
0 −1
] 0
−1
 −εe,k

2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0

−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI
  0,∀k. (6.10)
where
Sk,1 =

f (n)(t2)I
 2R2σe wHh¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12

 2R2σe wHh¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
H f (n)(t2)
 . (6.11)
Proof Please refer to Section 6.6.2. 
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Thus, the robust power minimization problem can be written as
min
s2,w,λk
s2, s.t.
 s2
w
 K 0,
S¯k(λk, f
(n)(t2))  0, ∀k,
1
σs
wHh¯s − εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2),
<{h¯Hl w} ≥ E
1
2 + εl‖w‖2, ={h¯Hl w} = 0, ∀l. (6.12)
The above problem is convex for a given t
(n)
2 at each iteration. Thus, an initialization
of t2 is given to solve the problem in (6.12) by using interior-point method, which
is updated iteratively. It is easily observed that t2 is updated when t
(n+1)
2 = t
(n)
2 ,
which confirms that the algorithm converges.
6.3 AN-aided Transmit Optimization for Secrecy
Rate Maximization
In the previous section, the secrecy rate maximization problem has been solved
to optimize the secure transmit beamformer. In this section, AN-aided transmit
optimization for secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated, where transmit
beamformer and AN are jointly designed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate with
the transmit power and the EH constraints.
6.3.1 Problem Formulation
The secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated subject to the transmit power
and the minimum EH constraints, where the transmit signal can be written as x =
ws+ v, and the secure transmit beamformer (i.e., w) and AN (i.e., v ∼ CN(0,V))
are jointly designed. This optimization problem can be formulated as
max
w,V
min
k
Rs −Re,k,
s.t. ‖w‖2 + Tr(V) ≤ P, [wwH ](i,i) + [V](i,i) ≤ pi, ∀i,
min
l
|hHl w|2 + hHl Vhl ≥ El, ∀l, V  0, (6.13)
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where [wwH ](i,i) + [V](i,i) (i = 1, ..., NT ) represents each antenna transmit power
constraint, and the mutual information at the legitimate user and k-th eavesdropper
can be written as
Rs = log
(
1 +
hHs ww
Hhs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
)
, Re,k = log
(
1 +
hHe,kww
Hhe,k
hHe,kVhe,k + σ
2
e
)
, ∀k.
The optimization problem (6.13) is not convex and cannot be solved directly. Thus,
two reformulations are proposed to make this problem tractable. Unlike [61], where
it has shown that the relaxed problem returns rank-two. In this section, a novel
SDP relaxation for the secrecy rate maximization is investigated, which shows that
the optimal solution returns rank-one to guarantee the optimal condition. First, the
optimization problem (6.13) is written by defining Qs = ww
H as
max
Qs,V
log
(
1 +
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
)
−max
k
log
(
1 +
hHe,kQshe,k
hHe,kVhe,k + σ
2
e
)
,
s.t. Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs + V)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (6.14a)
hHl (Qs + V)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (6.14b)
Qs  0,V  0, (6.14c)
rank(Qs) = 1,
where Ai = aia
H
i is the given antenna design parameters to adjust each antenna
power budget, and ai is a unit i-th vector (i.e., [ai]j = 1 for i = j and [ai]j = 0
for i 6= j). The specific applications of each antenna power constraint have already
been described in [29,101].
6.3.2 Secrecy Rate Maximization
For the secrecy rate maximization problem (6.13), two reformulations to jointly
optimize the transmit beamformer and AN, namely, two-level optimization and SCA
are provided.
6.3.2.1 Two-Level Optimization
In this section, two-level optimization is considered to handle the secrecy rate max-
imization problem (6.14). First, this optimization can be written by introducing a
106
6.3 AN-aided Transmit Optimization for Secrecy Rate Maximization
slack variable t as
max
Qs,V,t
Rs + log(t),
s.t. log
(
1 +
hHe,kQshe,k
hHe,kVhe,k + σ
2
e
)
≤ log(1
t
), ∀k, (6.15a)
(6.14a), (6.14b), (6.14c), rank(Qs) = 1. (6.15b)
The problem (6.15) is still not convex in terms of the constraint (6.15a), and cannot
be solved directly. Then, this optimization problem can be formulated as a two-level
optimization problem. The outer problem is a single-variable optimization problem
of t, which can be written as
max
t
log(1 + f(t)) + log(t), s.t. tmin ≤ t ≤ 1, (6.16)
where the lower bound tmin can be determined as
t ≥
(
1 +
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
hHs Qshs
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
λmax(Qs)‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
Tr(Qs)‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
≥
(
1 +
P‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1
= tmin, (6.17)
which can be handled by using 1D search method. The inner problem can be recast
for a given t as follows:
f(t) = max
Qs,V
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
,
s.t. (6.15a), (6.14a), (6.14b), (6.14c), (6.18)
rank(Qs) = 1.
It is easily verified that the constraint in (6.15) can be reformulated as
hHe,k
[
Qs − (1
t
− 1)V
]
he,k ≤ (1
t
− 1)σ2e . (6.19)
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Then, (6.18) can be recast for a given t as
f(t) = max
Qs,V
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
,
s.t. (6.19), (6.14a), (6.14b), (6.14c), rank(Qs)=1. (6.20)
The problem (6.20) is a quasi-convex problem without the nonconvex rank-one con-
straint, thus the Charnes-Cooper transformation is employed to convert it into a
convex problem by introducing δ so that the following relations hold:
Qs =
Q¯s
δ
, V =
V¯
δ
(6.21)
Thus, the problem (6.20) is relaxed as
f(t) = max
Q¯s,V¯,δ
hHs Q¯shs,
s.t. hHs V¯hs + δσ
2
b = 1,
hHe,k
[
Q¯s − (1
t
− 1)V¯
]
he,k ≤ (1
t
− 1)δσ2e ,
Tr(Q¯s + V¯) ≤ δP, Tr[Ai(Q¯s + V¯)] ≤ δpi, ∀i,
hHl (Q¯s + V¯)hl ≥ δEl, ∀l, Q¯s  0, V¯  0. (6.22)
The problem (6.22) is a convex problem, and can be solved efficiently by using
interior-point method [70]. Thus, the optimal solution to (6.20) can be obtained
through (6.21), once (6.22) has been solved.
6.3.2.2 Optimality Conditions for SDP Relaxation
In this subsection, the tightness of the SDP relaxation to (6.20) is investigated. It is
assumed that f(t) is the optimal value to (6.20), which can be achieved by solving
(6.22), resulting in the following inequality,
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
≥ f(t)⇒ hHs [Qs − f(t)V]hs ≥ f(t)σ2s , (6.23)
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Thus, the following power minimization problem is considered
min
Qs,V
Tr(Qs)
s.t. (6.23), (6.19), (6.14a), (6.14b), (6.14c). (6.24)
It is easily verified that the feasible solution to (6.24) is the optimal solution of (6.20)
due to the constraints (6.23), (6.14a), (6.14b), and (6.14c). Thus, the following
theorem is provided to show that the problem (6.24) yields a rank-one solution.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose the problem (6.24) is feasible, there always exists an optimal
solution (Qs, V) to (6.24) such that rank(Qs) = 1.
Proof Please refer to Section 6.6.3. 
From Theorem 6.1, a tightness analysis has been provided such that the problem
(6.20) yields a rank-one solution for all feasible t.
6.3.2.3 Successive Convex Approximation
In this section, SCA is proposed to jointly design secure transmit beamformer and
AN. First, the problem (6.13) can be modified as
min
Qs,V
max
k
(
σ2e + Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs + V)]
)(
σ2s + Tr(hsh
H
s V)
)
(
σ2s + Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs + V)]
)(
σ2e + Tr(he,kh
H
e,kV)
)
s.t.Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs + V)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (6.25a)
hHl (Qs + V)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (6.25b)
Qs  0, V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (6.25c)
Due to nonconvexity of the problem (6.25), the following exponential variables is
introduced to equivalently convert the objective function
ex0 = σ2s + Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs + V)], e
xk = σ2e + Tr(he,kh
H
e,kV),
eyk = σ2e + Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs + V)], e
y0 =σ2s + Tr(hsh
H
s V). (6.26)
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Thus, (6.25) can be written by introducing a slack variable τ as
min
Qs,V,x0,y0,xk,yk
τ (6.27a)
s.t. ey0−x0+yk−xk ≤ τ, (6.27b)
σ2s + Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs + V)] ≥ ex0 , σ2e + Tr(he,khHe,kV) ≥ exk , (6.27c)
σ2e + Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs + V)] ≤ eyk , σ2s + Tr(hshHs V) ≤ ey0 , (6.27d)
(6.25a), (6.25b), (6.25c), ∀k, l, i. (6.27e)
The above problem is not still convex in terms of the constraint (6.27d). Thus, the
Taylor approximation (i.e., axˆ + axˆ ln a(x− xˆ) ≤ ax) is employed to linearise (6.27d)
as follows:
σ2e + Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs + V)] ≤ eyˆk(yk − yˆk + 1), (6.28a)
σ2s + Tr(hsh
H
s V) ≤eyˆ0(y0 − yˆ0 + 1), (6.28b)
where yˆ0 and yˆk are approximated values such that y0 = yˆ0 and yk = yˆk when
the approximations are tight. Thus, the secrecy rate maximization problem can be
relaxed as
min
Qs,V,x0,y0,xk,yk,τ
τ
s.t. (6.25a), (6.25b), (6.27b), (6.27c), (6.28), ∀k, l, i,
Qs  0, V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (6.29)
The problem (6.29) is convex without the nonconvex rank-one constraint for a given
(yˆ0, yˆk), and can be solved by using an interior-point method. From SCA, the current
optimal solution can be updated iteratively until the constraints (6.27c) and (6.27d)
hold with equality, which implies (6.25) is optimally solved. This SCA algorithm
is outlined in Table 6.2. The optimal solution obtained by the SCA algorithm at
the n-th iteration is assumed to be (Q∗s(n),V
∗(n), x∗0(n), y
∗
0(n), x
∗
k(n), y
∗
k(n), τ
∗(n)),
which can achieve a stable point when the SCA algorithm converges [107].
Now, the tightness analysis to (6.27) is considered. It is assumed that (Q∗s,V
∗)
are the optimal solutions to (6.25) that are obtained by solving (6.29) with the
SCA algorithm, and the corresponding slack variables (i.e., x∗0, y
∗
0, x
∗
k, y
∗
k, τ
∗) can be
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Table 6.2: SCA algorithm for the robust secrecy rate maximization problem (6.27).
1. Initialize (Qs[0],V[0]) so that (6.27) is feasible, and given κ as the tolerance
factor for stopping criterion.
2. Iteration loop begin:
(a) Updating (x0[n], xk[n], y0[n], yk[n]) by (6.26).
(b) Solving (6.29) with (x0[n], xk[k], y0[n], yk[n]) to obtain (Qs[n],V[n]).
3. Iteration loop end until stopping criterion |τ(n+ 1)− τ(n)| ≤ κ.
obtained by (6.26) and (6.27b), respectively. Thus, the following power minimization
problem is required:
min
Qs,V
Tr(Qs)
s.t. (6.25a), (6.25b), Qs  0, V  0,
σ2s + Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs + V)] ≥ ex
∗
0 , σ2e + Tr(he,kh
H
e,kV) ≥ ex
∗
k ,
σ2e + Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs + V)] ≤ ey
∗
k , σ2s + Tr(hsh
H
s V) ≤ ey
∗
0 ,
∀k, l, i. (6.30)
It is assumed that the optimal solutions to (6.30) can be denoted as (Qˆs, Vˆ), which
are the feasible solutions to (6.25) with the objective value τˆ obtained by substituting
(Qˆs, Vˆ) into (6.25), and τˆ ≤ τ ∗ holds, which implies (Qˆs, Vˆ) is at least the same
optimal solution (Q∗s,V
∗) to (6.25). Thus, provided that the problem (6.30) is
feasible for positive secrecy rates, (6.30) always yield a rank-one solution, and the
proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.1.
6.3.3 Robust Secrecy Rate Maximization
In the previous subsection, the secrecy rate maximization problem has been solved
based on global CSI, however, it is not always possible that the legitimate trans-
mitter has perfect CSI due to lack of cooperation as well as the channel estimation
and quantization errors. In this subsection, the robust secrecy rate maximization
is considered to jointly optimize the transmit beamformer and AN by incorporat-
ing norm-bounded channel uncertainty shown in Section 6.2.2.1. In addition, per-
antenna power constraints is considered, where the Hermitian positive semidefinite
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(PSD) matrix Ai is not available at the legitimate transmitter, thus the true PSD
matrix can be written as
Ai=A¯i+∆i, ‖∆i‖F ≤i, ∀i, (6.31)
where A¯i ∈ HNT+ is the estimated Hermitian PSD matrix, and ∆i is estimated error
of the matrix A¯i, which can be modelled as a spherical uncertainty with a norm
bound i [57].
6.3.3.1 Two-Level Optimization
In this subsection, two-level optimization shown in 6.3.2.1 is considered to solve
the robust secrecy rate maximization, jointly designing secure transmit beamformer
and AN by incorporating the channel uncertainty. Since the outer problem does not
involve the channel uncertainty similar to Section 6.3.2.1, thus, in this subsection,
the inner problem is the main work, which can be written as
f(t) = max
Qs,V
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HV(h¯s + es) + σ2s
,
s.t. (h¯e,k + ee,k)
H
[
Qs −
(
1
t
− 1
)
V
]
(h¯e,k + ee,k) ≤ (1
t
− 1)σ2e ,
Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, max
∆i
Tr[(A¯i + ∆i)(Qs + V)] ≤ pi,
(h¯l + el)
H(Qs + V)(h¯l + el) ≥ El, ∀l,
Qs  0,V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (6.32)
Due to the nonconvexity of the problem (6.32), this robust secrecy rate maximization
problem can be modified by exploiting S-Procedure as
f(t) = max
Qs,V,λe,k,αl
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HV(h¯s + es) + σ2s
,
s.t. Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[A¯i(Qs + V)] + i‖Qs + V‖F ≤ pi, ∀i, (6.33a) λe,kI− [Qs − (1t − 1)V] −[Qs − (1t − 1)V]h¯e,k
−h¯He,k[Qs − (1t − 1)V] ck
  0, ∀k, (6.33b)
 αlI + (Qs + V) (Qs + V)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs + V) h¯
H
l (Qs + V)h¯l − El − αlε2l
  0, ∀l, (6.33c)
Qs  0,V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (6.33d)
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where ck = −h¯He,k[(Qs− 1t−1)V]h¯e,k+(1t−1)σ2e−λe,kε2e,k. Then, a slack variable τ is
introduced to relax the objective function in (6.33). By exploiting S-Procedure and
Charnes-Cooper transformation, this robust problem can be expressed as
f(t) = max
Q¯s,V¯,λs,µs,λe,k,αl,δ,τ
τ,
s.t.
 λsI + Q¯s Q¯sh¯s
h¯Hs Q¯s h¯
H
s Q¯sh¯s − τ − λsε2s
0,
 µsI− V¯ −V¯h¯s
−h¯Hs V¯ −h¯Hs V¯h¯s − δσ2s + 1− µsε2s
0,
 λe,kI− [Q¯s − (1t − 1)V¯] −[Q¯s − (1t − 1)V¯]h¯e,k
−h¯He,k[Q¯s − (1t − 1)V¯] c¯k
  0,
 αlI + (Q¯s + V¯) (Q¯s + V¯)h¯l
h¯Hl (Q¯s + V¯) h¯
H
l (Q¯s + V¯)h¯l − δEl − αlε2l
  0,
Tr[A¯i(Q¯s + V¯)] + i‖Q¯s + V¯‖F ≤ δpi,∀i,
Tr(Q¯s + V¯) ≤ δP, Q¯s  0, V˜  0, t ≥ 0. (6.34)
where c¯k = −h¯He,k[Q¯s−(1t −1)V¯]h¯e,k+δ(1t −1)σ2e−λe,kε2e,k. Without the nonconvex
rank constraint, (6.34) is convex, and can be solved by using interior-point method.
By solving the problem (6.34), the optimal value f(t)∗ can be written as
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HV(h¯s + es) + σ2s
≥ f(t)∗,
⇒ (h¯s + es)H [Qs − f(t)∗V](h¯s + es) ≥ f(t)∗σ2s . (6.35)
Thus, the associated power minimization problem is considered as
min
Qs,V,αl,βs,λe,k
Tr(Qs),
s.t. (6.33a)− (6.33c), (6.36a) βsI + [Qs − f(t)∗V] [Qs − f(t)∗V]h¯s
h¯Hs [Qs − f(t)∗V] ds
  0, (6.36b)
where ds = h¯
H
s [Qs−f(t)∗V]h¯s−f(t)∗σ2s−βsε2s. (6.36b) is achieved by employing
S-Procedure. It is easily verified that the feasible solution to (6.36) is optimal for
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(6.33), which is derived from (6.36a) and (6.36b). Thus, the following theorem holds
to show that the optimal solution to (6.33) is rank-one:
Theorem 6.2 Provided that (6.36) is feasible, there always exists an optimal solu-
tion to (6.36) such that rank(Qs) ≤ 1.
Proof Please refer to Section 6.6.4. 
6.3.3.2 Successive Convex Approximation
Now, the SCA reformulation is considered to solve the robust secrecy rate maxi-
mization problem to jointly optimize secure transmit beamformer and AN by in-
corporating channel uncertainty. This robust optimization problem is written as
min
Qs,V
max
k
te,krs
tsre,k
(6.37a)
s.t. Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[(A¯i + ∆i)(Qs + V)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (6.37b)
(h¯l + el)
H(Qs + V)(h¯l + el) ≥ El, ∀l, (6.37c)
Qs  0, V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (6.37d)
where te,k = σ
2
e + (h¯e,k +ee,k)
H(Qs+V)(h¯e,k +ee,k), rs = σ
2
s + (h¯s+es)
HV(h¯s+es),
ts = σ
2
s + (h¯s + es)
H(Qs + V)(h¯s + es) and re,k = σ
2
e + (h¯e,k + ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k + ee,k).
The above problem is convex in terms of (6.37a) and (6.37c). Firs, the exponential
variables are introduced to modified (6.37a) as
ex0 ≤ σ2s + min
es
(h¯s + es)
H(Qs + V)(h¯s + es), (6.38a)
exk ≤ σ2e + min
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k + ee,k), (6.38b)
eyk ≥ σ2e + max
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
H(Qs + V)(h¯e,k + ee,k), (6.38c)
ey0 ≥ σ2s + max
es
(h¯s + es)
HV(h¯s + es), (6.38d)
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By employing the slack variables (i.e., τ , us, ue,k, vs, and ve,k) for (6.37a), (6.38a),
(6.38b), (6.38c), and (6.38d), respectively, (6.37) can be reformulated as
min
Ω
τ,
s.t. ey0+yk−x0−xk ≤ τ, (6.37b), (6.37c), (6.37d),
ex0 ≤ σ2s + us, min
es
(h¯s + es)
H [Qs + V](h¯s + es) ≥ us, (6.39a)
exk ≤ σ2e + ue,k, min
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k + ee,k) ≥ ue,k, (6.39b)
eyk ≥ σ2e + ve,k, max
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
H(Qs + V)(h¯e,k + ee,k) ≤ ve,k, (6.39c)
ey0 ≥ σ2s + vs, max
es
(h¯s + es)
HV(h¯s + es) ≤ vs, (6.39d)
{Qs,V, es, ee,k, x0, y0, xk, yk, us, ue,k, vs, ve,k} ∈ Ω, ∀k, l, i. (6.39e)
By exploiting S-Procedure and the first-order Taylor approximation, the problem
(6.39a) is written as
min
Ω
τ,
s.t. ey0+yk−x0−xk ≤ τ, ex0 ≤ σ2s + us, exk ≤ σ2e + ue,k, (6.40a)
ey¯k(yk − y¯k + 1) ≥ σ2e + ve,k, ey¯0(y0 − y¯0 + 1) ≥ σ2s + vs, (6.40b) λsI + (Qs + V) (Qs + V)h¯s
h¯Hs (Qs + V) h¯
H
s (Qs + V)h¯s − us − λsε2s
0, (6.40c)
 λe,kI + V Vh¯e,k
h¯He,kV h¯
H
e,kVh¯e,k − ue,k − λe,kε2e,k
  0, (6.40d)
 βe,kI− (Qs + V) −(Qs + V)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(Qs + V) −h¯He,k(Qs + V)h¯e,k + ve,k − βe,kε2e,k
  0, (6.40e)
 βsI−V −Vh¯s
−h¯Hs V −h¯Hs Vh¯s + vs − βsε2s
  0, (6.40f)
 αlI + (Qs + V) (Qs + V)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs + V) h¯
H
l (Qs + V)h¯l − El − αlε2l
  0, (6.40g)
Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[A¯i(Qs + V)] + i‖Qs + V‖F ≤ pi,
{Qs  0,V  0, x0, y0, xk, yk, us, ue,k, vs, ve,k,
λs ≥ 0, λe,k ≥ 0, βs ≥ 0, βe,k ≥ 0, αl ≥ 0} ∈ Ω, ∀k, l, i. (6.40h)
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The above problem is convex for a given y¯k and y¯0 at each iteration, and can be solved
by using the interior-point method to update the solution for the next iteration until
the algorithm converges. Thus the SCA based robust scheme is similar to Table 6.2.
On the other hand, there exists a rank-onel solution to (6.40), and the proof is
similar to that of Theorem 6.2.
6.4 Simulation Results
Simulation results are provided to validate the proposed algorithms. A MISO secrecy
system is considered in the presence of three eavesdroppers and two EH receivers.
The legitimate transmitter is equipped with four transmit antennas (i.e., NT = 4),
whereas the other receivers (i.e., legitimate user, eavesdroppers and EH receivers)
are equipped with a single antenna. It is assumed that the channel coefficients are
modelled as both large-scale fading and small-scale fading. The simplified large-scale
fading model is given by
D = A0
(
d
dr
)−α
, for d ≥ dr, (6.41)
where A0 = 1, d represents the distance between the transmitter and all receivers
(i.e., legitimate user ds, passive eavesdroppers de, and the energy receivers dl), dr
denotes a reference distance set to be 20 meters, and α = 3 is the path loss expo-
nent. The small scale fading channel coefficients are assumed to be Rician fading
with Rician factor 5 dB. Note that for the involved line-of-sight (LOS) component
is modelled as the far-field uniform linear antenna array [108]. In addition, it is
assumed that σ2s = σ
2
e = −40 dBm, and the distances between the transmitter and
the legitimate user, the passive eavesdroppers, as well as the energy receivers are set
to be 100, 50, 25 meters unless specified. The target transmit power is assumed to
be 30 dBm (1w), and the target harvested power is set to be 1mw. All error bounds
(i.e., εs, εe,k and εl) are set to be 0.1 or 0.2 unless specified.
First, the secure transmit beamformer for secrecy rate maximization is evalu-
ated. Fig. 6.1 shows the achieved secrecy rate with different transmit powers, where
it is easily observed that the achieved secrecy rate increases with transmit power,
and the proposed scheme achieves the same performance with the SDP relaxation
based scheme in terms of achieved secrecy rate. In order to improve the security in
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Figure 6.1: Achieved secrecy rate with different transmit powers.
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Figure 6.2: AN assisted achieved secrecy rate with different transmit powers.
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SWIPT system, AN-aided secrecy rate versus transmit power is plotted in Fig. 6.2
based on both reformulations: two-level optimization and SCA. From this result,
one can observe that the secrecy rate of the two proposed schemes increase with
transmit power, and both schemes have a similar performance in terms of secrecy
rate. In addition, the SCA based scheme outperforms two-level optimization scheme
in lower transmit power regime.
Then, the security performance with EH performance is evaluated in Fig. 6.3,
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Figure 6.3: Achieved secrecy rate with target harvested power.
which shows that the achieved secrecy rate versus the target harvested power. One
can be observed from this result that the secrecy rate decreases with the target
harvested power based on perfect and imperfect CSI. Also, we compare our pro-
posed schemes (‘1D’ and ‘SCA’) with the robust schemes (‘1D Benchmark’), 1D
based scheme with Gaussian randomization (‘1D GR’), and two-dimensional search
based scheme (‘2D’) shown in [61], as well as the case without AN (‘NO AN’), in
which the proposed SCA based scheme outperforms our proposed 1D scheme, 1D
Benchmark scheme, 1D GR scheme, and NO AN scheme. The SCA based scheme
has a similar performance to 2D based scheme in terms of secrecy rate. Fig. 6.4
shows the percentage of AN power consumption in the total transmit power P ver-
sus transmit power, which shows that the proportion of AN power consumed to
interfere the eavesdroppers or energy harvesting. It is observed that this proportion
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Figure 6.4: The proportion of AN power consumption versus transmit power.
increases and then declines with the increase in transmit power at lower transmit
power regime, the percentage of consumed AN power should increase which ensures
secure communications and satisfies the EH constraint. When transmit power is high
enough, in order to further increase the secrecy rate required, more power should be
allocated to the message-bearing signals so that the AN power may get decreased.
The scheme without EH receivers has a lower proportion than the scheme with EH
receivers, since the AN is introduced to interfere with the passive eavesdropper only
in the system without EH receiver.
Finally, the achieved secrecy rate and the harvested power versus the distances
between the transmitter and the legitimate user (i.e., ds), as well as the EH receivers
(i.e., dl) are evaluated, respectively. Fig. 6.5 shows the secrecy rate versus ds, where
the achieved secrecy rate decreases with ds. In addition, the SCA based scheme out-
performs the 1D based scheme in terms of the achieved secrecy rate. Fig. 6.6 shows
the EH performance versus dl. From this result, the harvested power decreases with
dl, approaching zero after ds = 40 m.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, the secrecy rate maximization problem has been investigated for
a MISO SWIPT secure channel in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and EH
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receivers. Transmit beamformer was designed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate
while satisfying the transmit power and the EH constraints. A two-step approach
with SOCP approximation was considered to design secure transmit optimization
for the secrecy rate maximization problem. While AN-aided transmit optimization
was developed to solve this secrecy rate maximization problem by exploiting two-
level optimization and SCA. Furthermore, tightness analyses have been provided to
guarantee the optimal condition for the SDP relaxation.
6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
In order to prove Lemma 6.1, the secrecy rate constraint in (6.5) is written as
1
σ2s
|wHhs|2 ≥
 2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
H  2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
 (6.42)
Then, the following lemma is required to convert (6.42) as a linear matrix inequality
(LMI)
Lemma 6.3 (Schur complement) [70]: Let X be a complex hermitian matrix,
X = XH =
 A B
BH C
 (6.43)
Thus, S = C − BHA−1B is the Schur complement of A in X, and the following
statements hold:
• X  0, if and only if A  0 and S  0.
• if A  0 then X  0 if and only if S  0.
By exploiting the Schur complement, (6.42) can be reformulated as

1
σs
wHhsI
 2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12

 2R2σe wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
H 1
σs
wHhs
  0, (6.44)
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In addition, the reformulation of the EH constraint (6.5) is considered. In order to
express this constraint clearly, two variables (i.e., xl ∈ R and yl ∈ R) are introduced
such that this constraint can be equivalently modified as
x2l + y
2
l ≥ E, (6.45a)
xl = <{wHhl}, yl = ={wHhl}, ∀l. (6.45b)
The constraint (6.45b) is convex (linear), whereas (6.45a) is not convex, thus, a
first-order Taylor approximation is considered to obtain the desired upper bound.
Setting ul = [xl yl]
T , gives, x2l + y
2
l = u
T
l ul. u
(n)
l is the n-th iteration of the vector
ul. Thus, (6.45a) can be approximated as
uTl ul ≈ ‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)], (6.46)
where i denotes the i-th element of the vector ul. This completes Lemma 6.1. 
6.6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2
The second constraint (6.8) can be written by exploiting the Schur complement as
S
′
k =

f (n)(t2)I
 2R2σe wH(h¯e,k + ee,k)
(2R − 1) 12

 2R2σe wH(h¯e,k + ee,k)
(2R − 1) 12
H f (n)(t2)
  0, (6.47)
where f (n)(t2) has been defined in (6.9). The the following lemma is given to remove
the impact of the channel uncertainty
Lemma 6.4 [100, 109]: For a given set of matrices A = AH , B and C, the
following linear matrix inequality is satisfied:
A  BXC + CHXHB, ‖X‖ ≤ t, (6.48)
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if and only if there exist non-negative real numbers a such that A− aCHC −tBH
−tB aI
  0. (6.49)
By exploiting Lemma 6.4, the constraint (6.47) is written as
Sk 

2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0
 ee,k [ 0 −1 ]+
 0
−1
 eHe,k [ 2R2σe w 0 0 ] , (6.50)
where
Sk =

f (n)(t2)I
 2R2σe wHh¯e,k
(2R−1) 12

 2R2σe wHh¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
H f (n)(t2)
 (6.51)
Thus, (6.47) can be reformulated as
S¯k =

Sk − λk
[
0 −1
] 0
−1
 −εe,k

2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0

−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI
  0,∀k. (6.52)
This completes Lemma 6.2. 
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6.6.3 Proof of Theorem 6.1
In order to show Theorem 6.1, first, the Lagrange dual function to (6.24) can be
written as
L(Qs,V,Y,Z, λ, µ, ηi, νl, τk) = Tr(Qs)− λ
[
Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs − f(t)V)]− σ2sf(t)
]
+ µ
[
Tr(Qs + V)− P
]
+
NT∑
i=1
ηi
[
Tr[Ai(Qs + V)]− pi
]
−
L∑
l=1
νl
[
Tr[hlh
H
l (Qs + V)]
− El
]
+
K∑
k=1
τk
[
Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs − (t− 1)V)]− (t− 1)σ2e
]
− Tr(YQs)− Tr(ZV),
(6.53)
where Y ∈ HNT+ , Z ∈ HNT+ , λ ∈ R+, µ ∈ R+, ηi ∈ R+, νl ∈ R+, τk ∈ R+ denote the
dual variables of Qs, V, (6.23), (6.14a), (6.14b), and (6.19), respectively. Then, the
related KKT conditions is considered as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y = I− λhshHs + µI +
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi −
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l +
K∑
k=1
τkhe,kh
H
e,k,
(6.54a)
∂L
∂V
= 0,⇒ Z = λf(t)hshHs + µI +
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi −
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l −
K∑
k=1
τk(t− 1)he,khHe,k,
(6.54b)
QsY = 0,Z  0, λ ≥ 0, ∀i, l, k. (6.54c)
By subtracting (6.54b) from (6.54a), we have
Y − Z = I− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs +
K∑
k=1
τkthe,kh
H
e,k,
⇒ Y = A− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs , (6.55)
where A = I + Z +
∑K
k=1 τkthe,kh
H
e,k. From (6.55), one can easily observe that A is
positive definite, and rank(A) = NT , whereas rank(Y) = NT or NT − 1. However,
if rank(Y) = NT , then it violates Qs 6= 0. Thus, rank(Y) = NT − 1 always holds,
which implies Qs lies in the null space of Y from (6.54c), thus rank(Qs) = 1. This
completes Theorem 6.1. 
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6.6.4 Proof of Theorem 6.2
The dual function to (6.36) is written as follows:
L(Qs,V,Y,Z, λ, γi,Ts,Te,k,Tl) = Tr(Qs)− Tr(YQs)− Tr(ZV) + λ[Tr(Qs + V)
− P ] +
NT∑
i=1
γi
[
Tr[A¯i(Qs + V)] + i‖Qs + V‖F − pi
]
− Tr(TsA1)
− Tr[TsHHs (Qs − f(t)V)Hs]−
K∑
k=1
Tr(Te,kBk) +
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Te,kH
H
e,k[Qs − (t−1 − 1)V]He,k
]
−
L∑
l=1
Tr(TlCl)−
L∑
l=1
Tr[TlH
H
l (Qs + V)Hl], (6.56)
where Y ∈ HNT+ , Z ∈ HNT+ , λ ∈ R+, γi ∈ R+, Ts ∈ HNT+1+ , Te,k ∈ HNT+1+ and
Tl ∈ HNT+1+ are dual variables of Qs, V, (6.33a), (6.33c) and (6.33b), respectively.
In addition,
A1 =
 βsI 0
0H −f(t)σ2s − βsε2s
 , Hs = [ INT h¯s ] ,
Bk =
 λe,kI 0
0H (t−1 − 1)σ2e − λe,kε2e,k
 , He,k = [ INT h¯e,k ] ,
Cl =
 αlI 0
0H −El − αlε2l
 , Hl = [ INT h¯l ] .
The related KKT conditions are considered as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y = I + λI +
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i + i‖Qs + W‖−1F I]−HsTsHHs
+
K∑
k=1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k −
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (6.57a)
∂L
∂V
= 0,⇒ Z = λI +
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i + i‖Qs + W‖−1F I] + f(t)HsTsHHs
−
K∑
k=1
(t−1 − 1)He,kTe,kHHe,k −
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (6.57b)
QsY = 0,Z  0, ∀i, k, l, (6.57c)
[A1 + H
H
s (Qs − f(t)V)Hs]Ts = 0. (6.57d)
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By subtracting (6.57b) from (6.57a), the following equality holds:
Y − Z = I− [1 + f(t)]HsTsHHs +
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k,
⇒ Y + [1 + f(t)]HsTsHHs = I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k. (6.58)
Premultiply (6.58) by Qs
Qs
(
I + Z +
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k
)
= [1 + f(t)]QsHsTsH
H
s . (6.59)
The following rank relation holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
[
Qs
(
I + Z +
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k
)]
= rank(QsHsTsH
H
s ) ≤ min{rank(HsTsHHs ), rank(Qs)}. (6.60)
Based on the above rank relation, it is necessary to show rank(HsTsH
H
s ) ≤ 1 if we
claim rank(Qs) ≤ 1, thus, the two facts is considered as
[
INT 0
]
HHs = INT ,[
INT 0
]
A1 = βs
(
Hs −
[
0NT h¯s
])
.
Premultiply
[
INT 0
]
and postmultiply HHs by (6.57d), respectively, and applying
the above two equalities, the following relations hold:
βs
(
Hs −
[
0NT h¯s
])
TsH
H
s + [Qs − f(t)V]HsTsHHs = 0,
⇒
(
βsI + [Qs − f(t)V]
)
HsTsH
H
s = βs
[
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s . (6.61)
Lemma 6.5 If a block hermitian matrix P =
 P1 P2
P3 P4
  0, then the main
diagonal matrices P1 and P4 are always PSD matrices [93].
Now, it can be shown that βsI + [Qs − f(t)V]  0 and is nonsingular, thus
pre(post)multiply by a nonsingular matrix will not change the matrix rank. Thus,
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the following rank relation holds:
rank(HsTsH
H
s ) = rank
([
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s
)
≤ rank
([
0NT h¯s
])
≤ 1. (6.62)
This completes Theorem 6.2. 
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis has investigated various transmit optimization techniques of secrecy
rate optimization problems (power minimization and secrecy rate maximization)
for physical layer security using convex optimization techniques and game theory.
Transmit beamformer has been developed to obtain the optimal power allocation.
The proposed optimization problems were reformulated into convex ones, and associ-
ated robust schemes have been proposed by incorporating different forms of channel
uncertainty models.
In Chapter 4, transmit optimization for a multiple-input single-output (MISO)
secrecy channel has been investigated. Power minimization was first considered
to design the secure transmit beamformer and a second-order cone programming
(SOCP) based reformulation was proposed to solve this problem. In addition, a
closed-form solution of transmit beamformer for the scenario of an eavesdropper was
derived by employing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Second, the robust
schemes were investigated subject to outage probability secrecy rate constraint by
incorporating two statistical channel uncertainty models. A two-step algorithm with
both conservative reformulations (i.e., Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure)
was presented to handle this nonconvex optimization problem. Furthermore, an ini-
tial proof has been proposed to show that the optimal solution to the reformulated
problem was rank-one to guarantee its solution is also optimal to the original prob-
lem.
In Chapter 5, transmit optimization for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
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wiretap channel has been studied, where a multi-antenna cooperative jammer (CJ)
was employed to provide the jamming service to improve secure communication.
Power minimization and secrecy rate maximization have also been considered. To
solve these two non-convex problems, the transmit covariance matrices of the le-
gitimate transmitter and the CJ were designed, alternatively. For a given transmit
covariance matrix at the CJ, both problems were handled with a first-order Taylor
approximation. In addition, the robust scheme incorporating channel uncertainty
has been solved by exploiting S-Procedure, which can be formulated into a SDP.
Moreover, game theory based secure transmit optimization has been designed when
a private CJ is employed to introduce charges for its jamming service in terms of
interference and caused to the eavesdropper. This scheme was formulated as a Stack-
elberg game, where the private CJ and the transmitter have been modelled as the
leader and the follower, respectively, and both were to maximize their own revenue
function. For this proposed game, Stackelberg equilibrium has been analytically de-
rived with closed-form solutions.
In Chapter 6, transmit optimization for a MISO secure simultaneous wireless
information power transfer (SWIPT) system has been investigated, where secure
transmit beamformer was developed to maximize the achieved secrecy rate while
satisfying the transmit power budget and the EH constraint. A two-step algorithm
with SOCP reformulation was proposed to handle the nonconvex secrecy rate con-
striant, and first-order Taylor approximation was considered to linearize the EH
constraint. In addition, Secure transmit beamformer and AN were jointly designed,
where a two-level optimization and SCA have been proposed to relax this secrecy
rate maximization problem. Besides, it has been shown that the relaxed problem
yields a rank-one solution, which guarantees that its solution is optimal to the orig-
inal problem.
7.2 Future Work
The potential areas of future research stem from fifth generation (5G) wireless com-
munication networks, which has attracted more and more attention in recent years.
5G denotes the next major phase of mobile telecommunications standards beyond
the current 4G/IMT-Advanced standards, which provide much more than just fast
data speeds on mobile devices, envisioned as the key to providing seamless commu-
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nications. Spectral efficiency (SE), energy efficiency (EE), and security have been
considered for the evolutions of 5G wireless communication networks and can be
achieved by taking full advantage of limited radio spectrum effectively. Therefore,
SE and EE, together with security in 5G wireless communication networks will be
an important and promising topic for future research.
There are a series of key techniques in 5G wireless communications, including:
1. Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) - a shift from conventional telecom-
munication systems relying on interference free assumptions.
2. Massive multiple input and multiple output (MIMO) system - offering excess
degrees of freedom due to the use of hundreds of antennas at a single base
station, an important breakthrough due to recent advances in semiconductor
technologies.
3. Cooperative communications, and full duplex (FD) communication - impor-
tant physical layer solutions for spectrum crunch, a global phenomenon where
mobile communications are always hungry for more bandwidth resource.
4. Millimetre wave communications - a promising enabling technology for future
cellular networks since it operates in the 10-300GHz band, in which more
spectrum can be used for telecommunications
5. Device-to-device (D2D) communications and cognitive radio (CR) - impor-
tant for merging telecommunication networks with mobile internet, internet
of things, etc.
The key techniques of 5G, coupled with existing interests (i.e., physical layer
security and SWIPT), will become more and more attractive in the research of the
future wireless communications. Due to the issue of spectrum scarcity, the system
can be designed for realizing spectral and energy efficient with secure transmission.
Resource allocation algorithms is developed optimally to achieve these requirements.
First, FD system with security and SWIPT can be considered as a promising
area, where the FD base station (BS) employs the PS scheme to harvest power and
decode information from the uplink channel and self-interference (SI) channel with
self-energy recycling. At the same time, the FD BS broadcast their own information
to the user by utilizing the harvested power. The eavesdropper is considered to
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overhear the uplink and downlink transmission simultaneously. Thus, the FD BS
will guarantee the uplink and downlink secrecy rates to satisfy the reliability criteria,
and EH target to the FD BS for uplink transmission and self-energy recycling.
Second, secure energy efficiency (SEE) with SWIPT is another interesting area
that considers the ratio of the secure spectral efficiency (SSE) with the difference
between the total transmit power and the harvested power. The formulated prob-
lem involves a fractional programming, which can be typically solved by employ-
ing Dinkelbach’s algorithm. In addition, according to the property of fractional
programming, the novel reformulation can be proposed based on Charnes-Cooper
transformation and one-dimensional (1D) search. Also, the trade-off between SEE
and SSE can be analysed theoretically and numerically.
Third, CR (or D2D) system with security, where the primary system will share
their spectrum with the CR (or D2D) transceivers, also guarantees secure commu-
nications in the presence of passive eavesdroppers, or even when CR transceivers (or
D2D nodes) are untrusted that overhear the information from the primary system.
In this system, two schemes can be modelled, underlay and cooperative schemes.
The underlay scheme is that the primary transmitter and the secondary transmitter
send information to their dedicated receivers in a spectrum-sharing manner, whereas
for the cooperative scheme, the second user is willing to assist the primary transmis-
sion by employing amplify-and-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward (DF) relaying
to access the channel.
Based on the aforementioned analyses, the key techniques of 5G with the research
works in this thesis are promising to realize the optimal resource allocation for secure
wireless networks.
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